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MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN BUFORD.\*

BY MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES H. WILSON, U.S.V., BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U.S.A.

ON this historic field thirty-two years ago to-day the crimson tide of the great Rebellion reached its topmost mark. A little over a mile from this very spot it broke, forever in the East, as it did at the same time on the far-away bank of the Mississippi, forever in the West. The boiling and seething flood, lashed to fury by sectional interest and sectional hate, could not be calmed at once. Fiercely, but with diminishing force, it rolled on for nearly two years more, but after the double victories of Gettysburg and Vicksburg the end was never doubtful to the hopeful heart of the patriot. Peace, the white-winged messenger of God, showed clear and bright her benign face thenceforth, even through the rifts and smoke of battle that hung over the tangled thickets of the Wilderness and the blood-stained slopes of Chickamauga and northern Georgia.

The historian's glowing page tells of the hurrying marches and deadly battles throughout the widely extended field of war, in which the cause of slavery and of rebellion went down forever

\*Oration delivered at Gettysburg on July 1, 1895, when the Buford Memorial was dedicated.

before the loyal hosts of the National Union. They need no recital from us. We are met to-day, not to recount these thrilling chapters of the nation's history, nor yet to describe the incidents of the great battle which took place here. The pathetic and imperishable monuments which mark every feature of this lovely landscape, as well as every advanced position of either side in that sanguinary struggle, will hand down to remotest ages the unrivaled story of American valor and American patriotism.

Our task is rather to commemorate by this simple monument and effigy of bronze, and by these guns which opened the action at this spot, the virtues and services of the great soldier and honest, loyal gentleman, whose fortunate lot it was to select this field, and decide that here the battle should be fought, here that the great issue should be tried to the end between the Federal and Confederate hosts.

The statue of bronze and monument of granite which we here dedicate, are reared by loving hands to the ever sacred memory of Major-General JOHN BUFORD, and they too will tell their eloquent story of loyalty and duty to unending generations of patriotic youth. This living bronze speaks to us in the language of the self-contained and courageous soldier, whose calm and dignified person, whose lofty and confident bearing it so impressively brings back to the minds of his comrades gathered here to honor him. Happy and fortunate soldier thus to be honored—thus to be certified throughout all time to his countrymen!

It was not my good fortune to serve under this modest hero. My acquaintance with him was but slight. Indeed, I never met him except in the Antietam campaign, but I vividly recall, through the vista of a third of a century, his erect and manly figure, his bronzed and reassuring face, his flashing eyes, and above all, his calm self-possessed and confident demeanor. He was, at that time, in the very prime of both mind and body, and seemed to all who knew him then to be an ideal soldier and leader, and may we not say without boastful discrimination or injustice to the gallant volunteer, that the ideal soldier and leader of that day and epoch was the well educated, experienced and conscientious West Point graduate who had been ripened and matured by frontier service in the regular army? Surely, up to that time, the world offered no better school, and right successfully had it fashioned BUFORD and STANLEY and GREGG, and SHERIDAN and THOMAS, and STUART and VAN DORN and HARDEE, and even JOHNSTON and LEE of the cavalry, as well as a host of others of the infantry and artillery.

But something more than West Point and frontier service were needed to produce a BUFORD. He was "no sapling chance-sown by the fountain." He had had years of training and experience in his profession, and although they were precious and indispensable, they could not have produced the results which were realized in him, had it not been for the honorable deeds of his ancestors and the hereditary traits developed and transmitted by them. Such men as BUFORD are not the fruit of chance. Springing, as he did, from a sturdy Anglo-Norman family long settled in the "debatable land" on the borders of England and Scotland, he came by the virtues of the strong hand through inheritance. His kinsmen, as far back as they can be traced, were stout soldiers, rough fighters and hard riders, accustomed to lives of vicissitude, and holding what they had under the good old rule, the simple plan: "Those to take who have the power, and those to keep who can." Men of his name were the counsellors and companions of kings, and gained renown in the War of the Roses, and in the struggle for dominion over France. In the wars between the STUARTS and the Commonwealth they were "king's men."

The founder of the family in America was, as usual, a younger son who settled in Culpeper county about 1675, and became the progenitor of all the BUFORDS in Virginia, Kentucky, Carolina and Tennessee. Belonging by right to the gentry of the day, they became prominent men and leaders of the people in all that pertained to the public defense. Whether the name was originally "BEAUFORD" or "BEAU-FORT," it was pronounced BUFORD; but when trouble began to show itself with the mother country, tradition has it that a family council resolved to spell it thenceforth as it was pronounced. The first settler's name was THOMAS BUFORD, and tradition again has it that he invested most of his capital in horseflesh, and his descendants in all the generations have been noted for their fondness for the turf. Branches of the family appeared, in due time, in Bedford and Mecklenburg counties, and their names are found on all the muster rolls of the times. Captain THOMAS BUFORD, of Bedford, commanded a company of Fincastle men in Lord DUNMORE's war with the Indians, and was killed at the battle of the Great Kanawha in 1774. ABRAHAM BUFORD, of Culpeper, was a lieutenant in the same regiment, and JOHN BUFORD, a younger brother of the captain, was a non-commissioned officer. The lieutenant became a captain of minute men in 1775, and rose to the colonelcy of the Eighth Virginia, Continental line. He it was who commanded the battalion of raw levies in GREEN's Southern cam-

paign, which, in its retreat towards Virginia, was overtaken at Waxhaw Creek by TARLETON and almost annihilated.

The BUFORDS, like most of the patriotic Virginians, suffered heavily from the ravages and sacrifices of the Revolution, and sought to mend their fortunes by emigrating to Kentucky. ABRAHAM, SIMEON and JOHN, and perhaps others of the name, settled in Woodford county in 1790. They intermarried with the McDOWELLS, DUKES, ADAIRS, and other leading families, and multiplied rapidly. SIMEON's son JOHN became known as Colonel JOHN BUFORD, and was an influential citizen of Kentucky and Illinois. He was twice married. By his first wife he had a son who graduated at West Point in 1827, and after a successful career as a manufacturer and banker, became distinguished in the War of the Rebellion as NAPOLEON B. BUFORD. This gentleman was famous as a scholar and philosopher, and enjoyed the respect of all who knew him.

Colonel JOHN BUFORD's second wife was the daughter of Captain EDWARD HOWE, who served under HARRY LEE in the famous "Light Horse Legion." She was the mother of JOHN BUFORD, JR., as he was known till after the death of his father.

Thus it will be seen that the distinguished soldier whose services and virtues we commemorate here to-day, comes of a race of gentlemen who, in the lofty language imputed to a kinsman, were accustomed "to yield their persons willingly unto death to do their country good." SHAKESPEARE speaks of one of the name who may have also been a kinsman, "as another goodly mast," in England's ship of state. They were forward and resolute men of action—rarely ever professional men or statesmen. They were not in any way, nor in any former generation, brilliant people, but had strong practical sense and hardy constitutions. They were honest, straightforward, courageous, and had a strong tendency to arms. They were public-spirited citizens, doing their part boldly, and always in the vanguard of the race to which they belonged; and whether as Scotch bordermen, Colonial rebels, Indian fighters, king's men, or regular army men, standing up stoutly for their opinions, and doing what they conceived to be their duty to themselves and to their countrymen wherever it might take them. But strong and courageous and generous as they were through many generations, the very flower and jewel of their family was the knightly gentleman in whose name we are gathered here to-day.

Appointed to West Point from Illinois in 1844, he was graduated in 1848, too late for the Mexican War, but with the instinct of his family, he asked for and obtained assignment to the dragoons. His



first service was at Jefferson Barracks, whence, after a short time, he was sent to the Western frontier. Kansas, New Mexico, Texas, Nebraska and Utah became in turn the scene of his youthful labors and activities. Those border regions were at that time infested by Indians, who harried the settlements and kept the widely scattered detachments of regulars constantly on the alert and constantly employed. BUFORD, being of a serious turn of mind, and at all times conscientious and thorough in his work, soon attracted the attention of his superiors, and in due course was appointed regimental quartermaster of the Second Dragoons. From the start a good duty officer, he speedily became known as an equally good quartermaster, and as such learned many of the lessons most useful to a general. He served under HARNEY, the greatest Indian fighter of his day, in the campaign of 1855 against the Sioux, and received high praise for his conduct both on the march and in the battle of Bluewater. Later, he took part in the Utah expedition, and won the friendship and commendation of ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON and of P. ST. GEORGE COOKE, as a "most efficient and excellent officer." After returning from Utah, he was on duty in Washington till he received his commission of captain in the Second Dragoons, when he was sent to Oregon with a detachment of recruits. Rejoining his company at Fort Crittenden, Utah, he remained with it till early in 1861, when he was appointed major and assistant inspector general, and ordered again to Washington.

This appointment set the seal of the highest official approval upon his character and soldierly attainments. It certified to the army and to the country alike that he was one of the best officers at that time under the flag. Assigned to duty in the defenses of Washington, within four months he was appointed brigadier-general of volunteers, and as such was sent July 27, 1862, to act as chief of cavalry of BANKS' corps. Without delay he took personal command of a brigade composed of four regiments, the First Michigan, Fifth New York, First Vermont and First West Virginia Cavalry, and at once threw them against the enemy. He played a conspicuous part with his small but gallant force, and received a wound at the battle of Manassas in POPE's ill-starred campaign.

He was at that time ripe for the gallant and honorable career before him, and hastened back to the field as soon as his wound would permit. A distinguished officer of the same arm of the service, now the President of this Association, said of him that as a captain of dragoons "he was considered," in a regiment famed for its dashing and accomplished officers, "as the soldier par excellence."

He adds, in loving admiration, that "no man could be more popular or sincerely beloved by his fellow officers, nor could any officer be more thoroughly respected and admired by his men than he was. His company had no superior in the service." The same distinguished officer, writing after his career had closed in death, says: "He was a splendid cavalry officer, and one of the most successful in the service; was modest, yet brave; unostentatious, but prompt and persevering; ever ready to go where duty called him, and never shrinking from action however fraught with peril." And these are the elements of true greatness.

It is impossible, within the limits appropriate to this occasion, to recount the many details of BUFORD's splendid but brief career as a brigade and division commander. He took a conspicuous part in the campaigns of Northern Virginia, Antietam, Chancellorsville, Fredericksburg and Gettysburg, participating constantly in raids, skirmishes and battles, and everywhere and at all times bearing himself with perfect gallantry, and leading his followers with skill and prudence through every peril which beset them. He gave hearty and ungrudging support to POPE, no less than to McCLELLAN, BURNSIDE, HOOKER and MEADE. He joined no cabals, uttered no seditious words, and wrote no complaining letters, but honestly and loyally, with unshaken confidence and a stout heart, as a good soldier ought, upbore the flag, not always to victory it must be confessed, but everywhere with skill and credit. It was his misfortune that the day had not come for the best use of cavalry in close co-operation with infantry, but so far as lay within his discretion, it is plainly discernible that he believed in masses, organization and mutual support, and had no prejudices in favor of fighting with the saber, or against fighting dismounted when the circumstances of the case called for or seemed to justify it. He was a true dragoon, as well as a true cavalier, and had he lived till the end of the war could not have failed to reach the highest command in that branch of the service.

After serving with credit, though without any great feat of arms, as McCLELLAN's chief of cavalry, in the Antietam campaign, he was selected to command the Reserve Brigade, composed of four regiments of regulars and one of volunteer cavalry in the first systematic organization of the cavalry corps in the Army of the Potomac, and rendered gallant service at the battle of Fredericksburg and in STONEMAN's raid. He succeeded shortly to the command of the First Division, and bore himself splendidly in the brilliant but some-

what desultory and disjointed cavalry battles on June 9, 1863, with STUART's cavalry about Brandy Station.

From that time forth, till the end of the Gettysburg campaign, he kept close watch, in conjunction with GREGG's division, on LEE's northward march. In the splendid combats at Aldie, Middleburg, and Upperville, in which he took a leading part, the Federal cavalry for the first time gained a substantial victory over STUART and drove him back into the defile at Thoroughfare Gap. Crossing the Potomac at Edward's ferry behind the infantry, BUFORD pressed rapidly to the front through Frederick and Boonsborough into Pennsylvania and the Cumberland Valley near Waynesborough, and thence through the defile at Monterey to Fountaindale and Fairfield where, on the 29th of June, he overtook the enemy's infantry, with which he skirmished heavily, but needing artillery for effective work, and yet fearing that its use would cause a premature concentration of the enemy, he turned east towards Emmittsburg, where he met REYNOLDS with the First Corps. Pausing only long enough to tell his story, he advanced rapidly along the turnpike northeastwardly to Gettysburg, which place he reached at 2 P. M. on the 30th of June. He expected to meet here KILPATRICK, who had succeeded to the command of STAHEL's division, but instead found the town occupied by a small detachment of rebels, which he promptly drove out. He learned at once that EARLY of EWELL's corps had passed through towards York on the 26th. From the reports of his scouting parties which he kept out constantly, and from such scanty information as he could gather from the badly demoralized citizens, he became satisfied late that night that HILL's corps of the invading army had reached Cashtown, only nine miles to the westward, and had pushed an advanced force of infantry and artillery to within four miles of Gettysburg. Meanwhile, it must not be forgotten that his own command was badly fagged out. He had been constantly on the move from the 9th of June; his horses had had but little grain, and were beginning to need shoeing badly. The trains and regular supplies were far in the rear, and as the day had hardly come for living off of the country, especially our own country, the subsistence of the command was precarious, and the tendency to straggling almost irresistible. It was an anxious afternoon and a busy night for him and his brigade commanders. A hasty examination of the country about Gettysburg convinced him that its commanding features no less than the admirable system of highways radiating from it in all directions, would make it a strategic point of extraordinary value to the Union army. He saw at once that it

must be occupied as well for fighting, if that should be decided upon, as for obtaining information of the enemy's movements. Having sent out additional scouting parties during the night, and strongly picketed the roads towards Chambersburg, Mummasburg, Carlisle, Harrisburg, York and Hanover, he had by daylight gained positive information of the enemy's position and movements, and in his own graphic language had "completed his arrangements for entertaining him" until REYNOLDS, who had camped only five miles south of him, could reach the scene with the First and Eleventh Corps.

MERRITT, with the Reserve Brigade, having been detached by orders from General PLEASANTON, commanding the corps, the day before, BUFORD's force consisted of GAMBLE's and DEVIN's brigades only, in all eight regiments of 4,200 men, with CALEF's battery of horse artillery, which he posted as they debouched through the town on suitable ground commanding the roads to the west and north, so they could support the pickets and promptly deploy for battle. BUFORD himself encamped in the town, and it is now perfectly certain that he knew and declared that night that the battle between LEE and MEADE would be fought at Gettysburg, and that it would be a desperate one. On this important question the testimony of his signal officer is conclusive. Having been personally present, he makes the following explicit report of what occurred on the night of June 30th: "General BUFORD spent some hours with Colonel TOM DEVIN, and while commenting upon the information brought in by DEVIN's scouts, remarked — 'That the battle would be fought at that point, and that he was sure it would be commenced in the morning before the infantry would get up.' These were his own words. DEVIN did not share in this belief, and replied, 'That he would take care of all that would attack his front during the ensuing twenty-four hours.' BUFORD answered, 'No, you won't; they will attack you in the morning, and will come booming — skirmishers three deep. You will have to fight like the devil to hold your own until supports arrive. The enemy must know the importance of this position, and will strain every nerve to secure it; and if we are able to hold it, we will do well.' Upon returning to our headquarters he ordered me to seek out the most prominent point and watch everything; to be careful to look out for camp-fires, and in the morning for dust. He seemed anxious, more so than I ever saw him."

This same officer, who early in the morning of July 1st had taken his station in the cupola of the Theological Seminary, being the most eligible point of observation on the field, says: "The engagement was desperate, as we were opposed to the whole front of HILL's

corps. We held them in check fully two hours, and were nearly overpowered when, in looking about the country, I saw the corps flag of General REYNOLDS. I was still in the seminary steeple, but being the only signal officer with the cavalry, I had no one to communicate with, so I sent one of my men to BUFORD, who came up and looking through my glass confirmed my report, and remarked: 'Now we can hold the place.' General REYNOLDS and staff came up on a gallop in advance of the corps, when I made the following communication: 'REYNOLDS himself will be here in five minutes; his corps is about a mile behind.' BUFORD returned to my station, and watched anxiously through my signal telescope. When REYNOLDS came up, seeing BUFORD in the cupola, he cried out, 'What's the matter, JOHN?' 'The devil's to pay,' said BUFORD, upon reaching the ground. REYNOLDS said, 'I hope you can hold out until my corps comes up.' 'I reckon I can,' was the characteristic reply. The two officers then rode rapidly to the front."

But to return to the regular sequence of events. Early on the morning of July 1st, not later than 6 o'clock, GAMBLE's pickets on the Cashtown or Chambersburg road were driven in from their advanced posts beyond Willoughby Run. BUFORD, who was on the alert, and was promptly informed, at once ordered GAMBLE to support his pickets with his brigade and, if possible, drive the enemy back. The latter having already taken up a strong position on Seminary Ridge, overlooking the run and its valley, at the word moved proudly forward to meet the enemy. CALEF's battery was called from the point near town where it had bivouacked, and placed in position on the Chambersburg Road by BUFORD himself. DEVIN's brigade was thrown forward on the right so as to cover the space from GAMBLE's right on the railroad cut around to the Mummasburg Road. The object being to hold the advancing rebels back and to keep them out of Gettysburg as long as possible, or till the infantry could reach and occupy the ground, the gallant troopers dismounted and moved forward like infantrymen. The whole country between Willoughby Run and Rock Creek was covered by a well-posted line of pickets and skirmishers, so that no hostile force could possibly approach the town until that line was broken or driven back. Surprise was from the first impossible, and it was now merely a question of numbers and endurance. As has been shown, BUFORD, with unerring instinct, had perceived that Seminary Ridge running north and south to the west of the town must be held till MEADE's army could reach Gettysburg and take position on the dominating ground south of it. He entertained no illusion of any kind; he liked cav-

alry work, both mounted and dismounted, and had thoroughly enjoyed the brilliant successes he had gained at Brandy Station, and especially had he delighted in the rapid succession of charge and counter charge at Aldie, Middleburg and Upperville, by which STUART had been beaten and jammed back into Thoroughfare Gap. We may be sure he would have liked nothing better than to try it over again with his gallant antagonist, had the latter been there, but inasmuch as it was certain that HILL's veteran infantry "with their tattered uniforms and bright bayonets," was before him, and must soon be joined by EWELL with STONEWALL JACKSON's men, he knew that there would be bloody work that day, and that it would be all the better for him and his gallant division if he could convince the enemy that they were fighting infantry instead of cavalry. For this reason, if no other, the cavalrymen were dismounted, and we may be sure did not disdain to avail themselves of any cover they could find. The horses were sent to the rear, or concealed, and the skirmish lines were long enough and dense enough to create the impression that they were backed up by a heavy force.

GAMBLE, upon whose front the main attack fell, made a resolute advance, and after a severe struggle, in which he was effectively aided by CALEF's well directed guns, drove the enemy across Willoughby Run; but the success was temporary. Gathering strength from the different divisions as they approached the field, the rebels in turn forced GAMBLE slowly back. By 10:10 BUFORD reported that HILL was driving his cavalry pickets and skirmishers in upon the main body of his command. Although REYNOLDS' leading division had moved at 8 o'clock from his camp on Marsh Creek, five miles from Gettysburg, it did not reach the field till a little after 10 A. M. REYNOLDS himself waiting for his column, reached the fighting line at 10, and going at once to the front, was shot through the head at 10:15. He was succeeded in command of the First and Eleventh Corps by HOWARD. On taking command of the two corps REYNOLDS turned over the First to DOUBLEDAY. WADSWORTH commanded the leading division, and it was this gallant gentleman who brought the first infantry troops into the field, and with them took the place of the hard pressed cavalry.

Time will not permit me to give the details of the bloody battle which followed that afternoon on Oak and Seminary Ridges. Nor is it necessary. The infantry arrived not a minute too soon. The cavalry had performed prodigies of valor, and against overwhelming odds had held the field for over four hours against the increasing pressure from LEE's veterans. If there are any here to-day who

participated with the Third Cavalry Division in the part it took a year later at the crossing of the Opequon and in the battle of Winchester under similar circumstances, they at least will know what GAMBLE and DEVIN went through with, and what anxieties the gallant BUFORD suffered while waiting for REYNOLDS and HOWARD to come to their relief. They had gone into action cheerfully and willingly in the morning, and with varying fortunes had done their best for four long hours. Relieved at first by WADSWORTH's infantry, they had a slight, but welcome respite from the desperate struggle; but the infantry was, in turn, overborne and driven back and had to call lustily for the support of the cavalry. BUFORD, in person, rushed GAMBLE promptly and vigorously to the left front to a strong position covered by a fence, under the shelter of which they broke the enemy's advancing line and compelled it to fall back upon its supports. The arrival of other divisions of the First Corps ultimately strengthened the Federal position, so that the cavalry could be withdrawn, first to the extreme left, of the advanced line, and then to Cemetery Hill, where it was held to cover the formation of the new and final line of battle extending from that place along the ridge towards the Roundtops and Devil's Den.

BUFORD had done his self-allotted task successfully and well—better, indeed, than anyone but himself then knew. Speaking many years afterwards of the part taken in this great day's work by BUFORD's cavalry, General FRANCIS A. WALKER, in the "History of the Second Army Corps," uses the following language: "On the left the remnants of the shattered First Corps were forming along Cemetery Ridge under cover of BUFORD's brigades of cavalry, (GAMBLE's brigade only), which, drawn up in a line of battalions in mass, stood as steady as if on parade." This was, as near as can be fixed, at half past three on July 1st, and after their bloody and prolonged work against the Confederate infantry, was as high a compliment as could be paid to the cavalry, but it was not all. The author, himself a splendid soldier, adds: "When last it was my privilege to see General HANCOCK, in November, 1885, he pointed out to me from Cemetery Hill the position occupied by BUFORD at this critical juncture, and assured me that among the most inspiring sights of his military career was the splendid spectacle of that gallant cavalry as it stood there unshaken and undaunted in the face of the advancing Confederate infantry." No higher commendation for the cavalry can be found. Its services have generally been minimized, if not entirely ignored, by popular historians, but no competent critic can read the official reports or the COMTE DE PARIS'



"History of the Civil War in America" without giving the cavalry the highest praise for its work on this day, and throughout this campaign. "To BUFORD was assigned the post of danger and responsibility. He, and he alone, selected the ground," says that trustworthy historian, "upon which unforeseen circumstances were about to bring the two armies into hostile contact. Neither MEADE nor LEE had any personal knowledge of it. \* \* \* BUFORD, who, when he arrived on the evening of the 30th, had guessed at one glance the advantage to be derived from these positions, did not have time to give a description of them to MEADE and receive his instructions. The unfailing indications to an officer of so much experience, however, revealed to BUFORD the approach of the enemy. Knowing that REYNOLDS was within supporting distance of him, he boldly resolved to risk everything in order to allow the latter time to reach Gettysburg in advance of the Confederate army. This first inspiration of a cavalry officer and a true soldier decided in every respect the fate of the campaign. It was BUFORD who selected the battlefield where the two armies were about to measure their strength."

There is but little left to say. BUFORD having selected and held the battlefield, and successfully covered the formation of the line on the ridges against which LEE's veteran corps fought themselves to a frazzle in the two days bloody conflict which followed, camped that night on the extreme left, and picketed the country well out towards Fairfield. The next day, after being engaged with sharpshooters, he was relieved by SICKEL's corps, and permitted to withdraw by the left and rear as far as Taneytown, and on the 3d to Westminster to rest and refit, and possibly to be ready to cover a retrograde movement of the army in that direction if haply such a movement should become necessary.

As soon as it was known that the enemy had begun his retreat to Virginia, BUFORD took part with GREGG and KILPATRICK in pursuing him by Frederick and Williamsport through Warrenton and Culpeper to the south side of the Rapidan. His last action was at Bristow Station on October 14th. The hard and constant work he had done had begun to tell upon his constitution. Weakened by his wound he fell sick, and in November was permitted to return to Washington for better treatment than could be given to him in the field. But there he gradually grew worse, and on the 16th of December, 1863, the very day upon which President LINCOLN had signed and sent him his commission as Major-General his eyes were closed forever in death. And here it is proper to remark that

no general who was killed in battle, or died from natural cause during the war, was more profoundly regretted by his companions, or by the government and loyal people, than JOHN BUFORD. Like REYNOLDS, MCPHERSON and SEDGWICK, he had reached the prime of his powers and his virtues, and having been tried as by fire he was believed to be worthy of the highest command and responsibilities. What would have been the career of this modest gentleman and true soldier had he been spared to the end of the great war, must forever remain a matter of conjecture; but unless all signs fail, he must have gone on in success and honors, and reached the highest round of fame. We know from experience that —

“There is a history in all men’s lives.

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The which observed, a man may prophesy,  
With a near aim of the main chance of things,  
As yet not come to pass.”

May we not from the facts related “prophesy with a near aim” that this good soldier’s future, had he lived, would have been still more brilliant and successful? His work from his first entry into the military service, as we have seen, was of the highest quality. It had won for him general recognition as the best cavalry leader yet developed in the Army of the Potomac. Finally, it must be conceded that his selection of the battlefield of Gettysburg and his retention of it against overwhelming odds, were services of the first magnitude, and indicate clearly that he possessed the highest attributes of generalship. They fully justify the modest claim made in his official report for himself and his gallant followers: “A heavy task was before us. We were equal to it, and shall all remember that at Gettysburg we did our country much service.”

And surely our country will remember it also. In the words of the immortal LINCOLN: “It can never forget what they did here.” Having dedicated this monument with all the solemnity we could give to the occasion; having refreshed here our patriotism and consecrated ourselves anew to the Union, one and indivisible, let us again, in the words and spirit of the martyred President, “Here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain; that this nation shall have a new birth of freedom; and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”

## THE TRAINING OF THE RECRUIT.

BY FIRST LIEUTENANT FREDERICK S. FOLTZ, FIRST U. S. CAVALRY.

I CONSIDER this subject in the light of experience in two opposite systems—the troop system, and the system of the Cavalry Recruiting Depot, where I have been on duty for the past two years. The Cavalry Recruiting Depot having for good and sufficient reasons been abandoned, let us see whether the troop system of recruit training fully meets the requirements, and if not, whether we can formulate a scheme more in harmony with existing conditions. Each regiment now has control of its recruits, and can train them together if so desired, limited only by the conditions imposed by the manner in which the troops of the regiment are still scattered, at points not tributary to regimental headquarters.

It will not be useful for our purpose to study the recruit training in Continental armies, where the men arrive at a stated time each year, thus permitting the formulation of a course of instruction that culminates with the absorption of the recruit in the squadron at the autumn maneuvers.

The best way to learn to skate is to skate and keep on skating, and were our troops in active service in the field, as used to be the case on the frontier, then there would be no better school for the recruit than his own military family, and no quicker way to produce a true fighter and campaigner. This of course implies that the recruits should, even then, join their troop a few at a time, for no troop of forty men can assimilate twenty additional recruits in two weeks of bitter winter weather and feel equal to tackling its weight in wild cats, or even Pine Ridge Sioux for that matter.

In Napoleonic times, and until the Franco-Prussian War showed the world how short had become the time for actual experience in the great school of war, all European nations relied to a great extent upon the training officers and men could receive in actual service.

Officers learned their duties in their regiments under the mentorship of some grizzled sergeant; recruits learned theirs in the rear rank, in lockstep with a front rank file to whom it was all an old story. All this is changed; and though our frontier work in past years has enabled us to lag behind, and most profitably, we must now change our system to meet new conditions.

Let us first examine the training a recruit receives in his own troop. The men arrive in small numbers, often singly; they are put in charge of some non-commissioned officer to be drilled into shape. The sergeant will usually have no particular love for the minutiae of recruit drill; he will, if he does his duty, be working hard with his men from morning until night, while the other non-commissioned officers about him are taking it easy in the intervals of ordinary garrison routine. Small wonder then, if he puts his squad through their work as superficially as possible, and reports them ready for the troop, with only a lick and a promise of their proper training.

The troop wants the men to help out with the guard duty, to ease up on the stable and kitchen police, to fill out the fatigue details. The first sergeant wants Recruit JONES as troop clerk; the captain needs BROWN, who is a tinner, to make some things for the troop; the quartermaster would like ROBINSON as a carpenter, and the adjutant must have SOLOMON LEVI to learn the cornet in the band. Everything thus conspires to the prejudice of the recruit's preliminary training; he can execute fours right and left with the troop, can march in review, and ride a horse with more or less injury to the animal, though the mount first assigned him has probably had all his fine points and feelings blunted long ago.

The lack of proper grounding will, however, show in the end; first, by contrast with the old soldier, and finally, as the troop fills with men of the new *régime*, the contrast will disappear, but the *esprit* and tone of the whole organization will assimilate itself to the recruit standard.

The recruit in a troop labors under many disadvantages. His work is necessarily hard and continuous, if we are going to condense his preliminary training into a period of six weeks or two months, as will be necessary.

No man likes to admit that he is unable to bear the strain to which all about him are equally subjected; but a very little work will make him grumble when intimately thrown with comrades who have some leisure, even though this leisure be gained at the expense of greater exertion or responsibility. The two or three men drilling

with him are lost sight of in the troop when the squad is dismissed, and his first associates will be usually those men who are most idle, easily familiar, and least likely to give him proper ideas. Again, he misses the great advantage of competition and emulation; his progress is not dependent upon his individual aptitude; there are no upper classes for him to pass rapidly through; no awkward squad to hold him while his fellows pass on. The pace of his little squad is that of the slowest man; the single instructor cannot push him forward and neglect the others, and even if a corporal is detailed to assist, he cannot teach to one the extended order movements or even excite the same interest in the orders of the sentinel or in the saber exercise that would be found in a squad of men each eager to be reported proficient before his fellows, and to drop the title of "Recruty."

How can a drill master exact neatness of person, immaculate arms, equipments, bunks and horses, smartness of bearing and military precision, when his recruits are constantly mingled with other men who, for perfectly good and sufficient reasons, may not be required to pay such attention to mere details.

In the field, or wherever there is good reason, we do not care for rust on a bit, sweat marks on saddlery, or bacon grease on clothing, and the forms of military courtesy are relaxed; but we know that every man understands that this is a concession to necessity. We are for the time being savages struggling with nature, with her cold or heat, her hunger or thirst, her fatigue, or only the loneliness of her wilderness. If we know that our men have learned how a bit and saddle should be kept; if we know that military deference and spirit is there, then we are willing to dispense with the evidence, and the training of the recruit should be such as to leave us in no doubt on these points.

Recruits of troops at the same post are often consolidated for drill under non-commissioned officers specially detailed, and this method is a step in the right direction, but it does not go far enough. The control of the instructor lasts only during drill hour, and at other times the recruits are scattered to their several troops, where usually they are under no special supervision, held under no stricter discipline, nor kept more busily occupied than the other men. The recruit, in this case, has the advantage of drilling with a larger squad, and probably under a better instructor than if the selection of the sergeant had been limited to one troop. He still, however, is held to the pace of the squad and cannot be advanced or retarded according to his individual aptitude.

The solution of the problem is found in a depot troop, which will have its functions in war as well as in peace, and which, as necessity demands, can be filled and made an effective troop, or skeletonized to its frame work of officers and non-commissioned officers.

The experiment of spoiling good Indian scouts to make a poor imitation soldier, seems to be dying a most natural and well-merited death; and as the Indian troops vanish in each regiment, it would seem that a frame work might be given for a depot troop.

Let "M" Troop be made a visible skeleton troop, not a nominal skeleton. Give it its complement of non-commissioned officers, its farrier, blacksmith, saddler, trumpeters, tailor and cook; give it back as many horses as may be found necessary; give it station at headquarters or at the most convenient post, with other troops of the regiment; give it the best quarters, the best stables, the best equipments, and require of it that, in consideration of these advantages, everything be kept in perfect condition.

If there is a riding hall at any post of the regiment, the depot troop should be there. Its non-commissioned officers should be picked men, and to secure the most efficient instructors their position could be made desirable by privileges in the way of quarters for some of them, separate rooms, and exemption from fatigue and guard. Among the non-commissioned officers should be an expert horseman, a gymnast and a swordsman, while all of them should be neat and soldierly.

The recruits should be quartered so that there should be at least two squads in separate rooms, men being distributed as they arrive among the squads, so that each shall have its proportion of the new arrivals. The chiefs of squad are charged with the interior instruction, barrack discipline, regulations, military courtesy, orders of sentinels, care of clothing, arms and equipments. The advantage of having two or more squads will become evident in the emulation which will develop between the different squads, or rather squad leaders.

The non-commissioned officer showing the greatest aptitude at mounted work should be kept at that work alone, assisted by as many as may be necessary of the other non-commissioned officers, according to the number of recruits and number of classes. One non-commissioned officer should be specially detailed as gymnastic instructor, and will find his time fully occupied with gymnastics and setting up exercises, with the care of the apparatus, and the en-

couragement and direction of sports. He will also usually be the sword-master.

When a recruit arrives the officer commanding the depot troop should see him at once, and by conversation learn as much as possible of his history and character, making notes afterwards for future reference and amplification. This preliminary interview should be had before he is taught to stand attention. He will give the most information from a comfortable chair.

The depot troop should have a thoroughly competent tailor, and he should be required to dress the recruit in self respecting shape as soon as possible after arrival. To save the clothing, mounted drills and gymnastics should be in blue shirts and stable overalls, the field belt being worn to support the trousers.

The horses should be ridden twice daily, morning and afternoon; they will thus learn their work better, and be more useful than double the number of animals ridden once daily. The recruit should not be pushed too rapidly to actual riding; it is hard to go back from that to the folding of the saddle-blanket, the nomenclature of parts of the horse, and other details which he eagerly seizes upon at the very outset. The gymnastic instructor should work in harmony with the instructor in riding, teaching the mounted exercises on the inexpensive and easily curried wooden horse, of which a number should be available.

Much use should be made of the horse on the longe. Half a dozen men will learn more gymnastics with a steady going animal on the circle than they would with a horse apiece in double the time. Grooming should be specially taught, and no man passed out of the grooming class until he can take a sweaty, dirty horse, whisp him dry, and bring him to a state of glossy perfection, hand rubbing his legs, and putting muscle into the brush. Time enough when he has learned this to tell him that grooming may sometimes be dispensed with, just as belts and arms may sometimes be worn scratched and greasy. After every drill the horses should be immediately groomed. The recruit thus learns to give his first attention, on dismounting, to his horse; and the horse gains in capacity for hard work, in clean legs, fine coat, and if he is black, stays black the year around. Saddlery is to be cleaned after every drill before the recruit leaves the stable, suitable racks being provided, convenient to water, where the sweat can be sponged off, the leather well soaped and metal oiled, before the saddles and bridles are put back in the saddle room.

On returning from riding, in warm weather, the squad should



be marched to the bath rooms and required to bathe before being dismissed. This not only in the interest of the individual, but for the benefit of those who are compelled to occupy the same room with him, for whose benefit he will also be required to be clean in speech.

Stormy weather should not suspend recruit drills, but only modify their character. There is always something the recruit can be taught indoors, and his military constitution is not yet sufficiently strong to stand more than one day's rest in seven. Lectures take the place of riding if there is no riding hall, the attention being held by requiring the recruits to answer questions in chorus at any moment. As for instance (the instructor touching a horse): "What part is this?" The recruits answer in chorus: "Hock," "Poll," etc. It will also be found useful to have the squads repeat in chorus during rests at drill the orders of sentinels, or matter which they may be required to memorize. The course of instruction should cover the whole of the School of the Trooper, stopping short of the School of the Troop.

The routine of the day should comprise one hour or more mounted; one hour gymnastics and setting up; one hour and twenty minutes foot drill, and manual of carbine, saber and pistol. For one class, the order might be as follows: Reveille, breakfast, policing quarters, gymnastics and setting up for one hour (uniform, stable overalls, undershirts, barrack shoes), inspection of quarters by troop commander, accompanied by chiefs of squads, recruits standing at bunks; leisure during guard mounting to allow recruits to witness ceremony and enjoy music; then mounted instruction, (uniform, leggins, overalls, blue shirts, forage caps), one full hour at least, after which comes morning stables; saddlery is put away clean, horses whisped dry and thoroughly groomed and hand rubbed; this will occupy another hour; then dinner, one hour's foot drill and manual, (uniform, blue shirts and trousers); at retreat twenty minutes foot drill and manual, in uniform as required for guard mounting at the post, arms and equipment carefully inspected. Evening stables would be attended by the other class which would ride in the afternoon and drill on foot after guard mounting.

Special attention should be paid to neatness at table, the recruits being required to wash before meals, and wear a specified dress. The white stable jacket, or the blue shirt, is more economical and cleaner than an old blouse. The mess call should be responded to as promptly as the call for any duty, and men coming in late should be turned out if unable to give proper explanation.

No recruit should be excused from any drill unless sick. The stable sergeant would need no further assistance, usually, than could be rendered easily by the farrier, blacksmith, saddler and wagoner, who, together with the tailor and trumpeters, would take their tours as kitchen police. No old soldiers, not required for special duty, should be retained in the depot troop, as the recruit will be better kept with other recruits exclusively until he passes to his own troop.

To sum up: I have outlined a system which concentrates the efforts of a few picked instructors upon the whole contingent of recruits for the regiment, and which concentrates into the recruit period much instruction which is now left to be picked up later, or not at all. For its full effect, the sanction of the War Department must be given, but the plan can at once be practically carried out by any post commander who can find the space necessary to quarter the recruits separately.

The necessary officer and non-commissioned officers could be detached from other troops, together with a cook, a kitchen police and a stable orderly. The troops from which these details were made would gain by having in their quarters and ranks none but men who had received thorough preliminary training, by putting in at least eight hours of solid, hard work every day during their stay in the recruit troop. Some recruits, who had had the advantage of military association or athletic training, would pass to duty with their troops in three weeks, while the slovenly men, the dullards and louts, would be held three months if necessary, or discharged.

The Adjutant-General, in a letter to the superintendent of recruiting service, has said: "If by reason either of temperament or habits, or of mental, moral or physical deficiency, he (the recruit) be found manifestly unfitted for the service, he is to be recommended for discharge. \* \* \* The advantages of this disposition of him are obvious. The government suffers the least possible pecuniary loss by the enlisting officer's mistake; regiments are spared the trouble or disgrace resulting from the assignment of ineffective, immoral or discontented persons, and discharges from regiments before expiration of term, always productive of restlessness among the contented portion of the rank and file, are reduced to a minimum. \* \* \* It must be remembered that the depots are not disciplinary institutions for loafers, criminals and worthless men. When a recruit is found to be a dullard, a drone, or a drunkard, he is not only of no account to the service, but an incubus upon it, to be got rid of by speedy discharge on special report."

The War Department has shown perfect willingness to discharge undesirable men upon the recommendation of the commanding officer of the cavalry recruiting depot, and it is presumed that it would, in the same way, second the efforts of regimental commanders.

The commander of the depot troop, having all his efforts concentrated on one object, and being assisted by non-commissioned officers similarly intent, would have a better opportunity than the commander of a regular troop, of judging the unfitness of men for military service, or for the cavalry arm. He would thus be able to rid the service within a few weeks of men who otherwise would lower the standard of the regiment, and who while borne on the rolls would never render any returns to the government for the money and effort wasted upon them. It cannot be claimed that the recruiting officer has made no mistakes, yet we at present retain all the men he sends, unless they can be discharged for physical disability, by the action of courts-martial, or of their own motion, by purchase. Cannot every troop commander put his finger upon men of his troop who are dead timber, but whom he cannot get rid of?

To quote once more from the Adjutant-General's letter: "The principal functions of recruiting depots are (1) to determine the aptitude of the recruit for military service, and (2) to give him such preliminary instruction," etc., etc. We have been giving him some preliminary instruction, but we have worked up every man regardless of his aptitude and fitness, even when, without special investigation, his want of aptitude or his unfitness forced themselves upon our observation. Let us then assume *all* of the functions which, with the mantle of the departed cavalry recruiting depot, have fallen upon our regimental shoulders.

## CONVERSATIONS ON CAVALRY; BY PRINCE KRAFT ZU HOHENLOHE-INGELFINGEN.

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TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN,  
BY LIEUTENANT CARL REICHMANN, NINTH INFANTRY, U. S. ARMY.

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THIRTEENTH CONVERSATION (APRIL 18, 1886).—THE SUBSEQUENT TRAINING OF  
THE OLDER MEN AND HORSES.

H. You said the last time you did not approve of forming the squadron anew each spring from the riding squads, and that the squadron should remain formed throughout the winter.

S. That is my opinion.

H. When the reserves have been dismissed and the recruits are not yet sufficiently advanced to drill with the squadron, the latter becomes so small as to cease to be a squadron.

S. It always is a squadron, though a weak one. What does that mean? We assumed forty recruits per year (including one one-year volunteers) as a high figure. For these we need thirty-nine service horses, for the one-year volunteer furnishes his own mount. Two contingents of remounts, numbering twenty-six horses, must be deducted; total, sixty-five, leaving seventy horses for the formed squadron.

H. You forget the twenty-six remount riders, the trumpeters and non-commissioned officers.

S. The twenty-six remount riders (if we have that number) must ride old horses, in addition to the remounts, otherwise they cannot remain firm riders. Nor should we forget that there are some recruits from the previous year who need additional training in riding. Let us calculate the number of horses first, that of the men afterward. If we wish to drill merely, we may form a squadron of three platoons from the seventy horses, if in the number of the most indispensable non-commissioned officers we limit ourselves to those on the flanks; that is, sixty-four trumpeters and eleven files per platoon (inclusive of two blank files), or twenty riders.

H. A single sick or detached horse will throw this calculation out.

S. Not at all; I simply take an additional blank file.

H. SCHMIDT does not approve of that.

S. For the great divisional exercises; and there I concur with him. For exercise within the squadron he wishes to have drill in single rank diligently practiced. He would not object to a few blank files in that case. I have another reason, however, why I would not like to form the squadron of seventy horses in three platoons of eleven files, which is the usual formation during winter.

H. What is your reason?

S. I would be limited to the six flank non-commissioned officers, besides depriving the remaining nine non-commissioned officers of their horses. My desire is to give to the squadron that formation in which it would have to take the field, and there each of the fifteen non-commissioned officers must have his horse, which, moreover, he should ride throughout the winter. Hence it would be rarely that I would turn out with the squadron formed in three platoons to go through some drill movements; I would form it definitely in two platoons in double rank, or in four platoons in single rank. I have enough horses for that purpose, though some may have to be deducted on account of detached service or sickness, for after allowing for fifteen non-commissioned officers' horses and four trumpeters' horses there remain fifty-one horses for the other riders.

H. The idea of forming the squadron in four platoons in single rank is an excellent one. It would enable us to have drill in single rank during the winter as advocated by SCHMIDT, without losing thereby much of the time allotted to drill. Would you not rather form the squadron in single rank anyway until the recruits join it, who then might ride in the rear rank?

S. That sounds very pretty, but is impracticable, because for orderly drill we need other riders in the rear rank also, specially for the guide file of each platoon. Furthermore, if the troop rides in single rank for six months, the men will lose eye for, and practice in, the observance of distances in wheeling by platoons.

H. Because there is no rear rank; that is true. It did not occur to me. I suppose you also agree that the platoons should not be less than eleven files on account of the distance.

S. Theoretically drill with ten files per platoon is impracticable, because in that case (including chief of platoon and his distance) there would be greater depth than front; in practice, however, it is otherwise. It is practicable with ten files. Let us, however, take

eleven files as a basis. I for one would rather drill with eleven than with ten files.

H. How will you get the riders for the fifty-one horses with which you are going to drill during the winter?

S. We have 133 men in the squadron, from which are to be deducted fifteen non-commissioned officers, four trumpeters, eight men on an average detached from the regiment, four officers' servants, two per cent. sick, *i. e.*, one or two men; five men for guard, kitchen or other interior service, lastly thirty-nine recruits; total seventy-seven men, which leaves us fifty-six.

H. Then you have five men more in the squadron than horses, and you cannot have every man ride every day. That has its disadvantages. It will not be possible to have every remount rider ride daily an old horse in addition to the remount.

S. I shall take good care not to let the select, best riders forget how to ride a trained horse. Other losses must also be considered. There are the tradesmen of the squadron who do not ride every day, also men detailed away from the regiment, as for instance "*ordnances du jour*" (daily messenger details), etc., and lastly, I prefer to have the worst riders change off and not ride every day, than to let the best riders get rusty.

H. These best riders are kept in practice by their remounts.

S. They might very easily acquire a faulty seat, and particularly so if serving in the second year, need daily practice on a trained horse to confirm the correct rider feeling. Some old, firm, excellent riders (non-commissioned officers) who, on account of their reputation, have an opportunity to ride officers' horses within and without the regiment, are the only ones whom I might excuse from riding each day on old horses in addition to the remount, if I have not enough horses.

H. In the number of horses you have not allowed for the sick, though you have in the number of men.

S. Because the sick horse would balance the sick man, but not the reverse. The whole calculation, however, is an approximation, and subject to many variations. For instance, when the number of recruits and remount riders is smaller, so that some of the latter have to ride two horses daily, then I need fewer old horses for the remount riders and recruits.

H. Very well. Let us assume our squadron to consist of seventy horses during winter. Are you not afraid you are acting contrary to all our traditions in not dividing the older men and horses in riding squads? Is it not necessary to confirm the riding proficiency

proper after the great summer exercises? Do you not think that the recruits of the past year will need additional training? Do you think that, after undergoing two years training, the remounts are so firm (laggards excepted) that they can serve eight years more and drill continually without being gone over again? Does not SCHMIDT demand that even the riders of the first-class, according to the then riding instructions, work their horses over again during the winter?

S. You are asking a great many questions at once. In the first place, I have not said at all that I would not divide the older riders into riding squads; because I form them in a small squadron during winter, I no more mean to omit that than to fail to do away with the division into squads in the spring and summer after the recruits have been placed in ranks. SCHMIDT demands expressly that the division into riding squads be kept up during the summer. Why should I not demand that the squadron remain formed during winter, when the riding under supervision of the squad instructors is chiefly practiced? With this demand, I am not in opposition to a single one of our old traditions. On the contrary, I am following an old tradition from the glorious period of the cavalry. The squadrons of the Great King remained ready for war as such throughout the year, and it did not prevent them from turning out for riding. You may infer that from the ungracious remark of the king mentioned by MARWITZ, as you stated yourself. The king said: "Who is in charge of the riding of the squadron?" Do you think that there was no individual riding under supervision of the squad instructors? The squadron commander, lieutenant, cornet or first sergeant, whoever was in charge, could not by himself have superintended the riding of the whole squadron.

H. Each instructor no doubt had his own squad. Last fall you invited my attention to the essay, "A Visit to Ohlau in 1772," which appeared in No. 41 of the official publication, *The Comrade*, on October 10, 1885. There the Saxon officer who visited SEIDLITZ reports, that in the evening after the horses had been taken to water, "each rider took a turn around the place at a gallop, and finished by taking some obstacles at full speed and with ease." The report continues: "All the officers were assembled on the place dismounted. They followed attentively the movements of each rider, correcting here, remedying there, and advising." In the morning the general drilled; he commanded everything himself, and for an hour—that was the duration of the drill—not a word was spoken or movement made except by his order.



S. I wish we could turn out twice each day, once in the morning for an hour's drill, and once for another hour, more conveniently appointed, for individual riding and "tummeln." Besides the distance of the drill ground from the stables there are many other circumstances which prevent us from doing so in most garrisons. As for the rest, we can do just as SEIDLITZ did—drill and individual riding on the same day. Both the formed squadron and riding in squads should go on at the same time throughout the year, summer and winter. I can see no reason why this approved practice of the Great King has been departed from.

H. Simply because of the adoption of universal liability to three years' service, and the resulting reduction of the squadron after furloughing the reserves.

S. We know that that is not a good reason. Any way, we can drill in the school of the squadron with four platoons in double rank, however reduced the squadron may be. All we have to do is to combine several squadrons for the purpose.

H. Not often, let us hope. The squadron should form a unit in itself.

S. Certainly; not often, however, perhaps twice or thrice during the winter. As to your questions regarding additional training of recruits and old remounts of the past year, no one could be better convinced of its necessity than I am. But it can also be done, if the squadron turns out formed as squadron, and, on the drill ground, is divided into riding squads. I am, however, decidedly opposed to retraining and tormenting every year, as is universally done, all well trained horses which are firm in their gaits, for it simply results in harm to them. It is useless cruelty to animals, and, what is worse, the main ideas of riding, which were imparted to the recruit with so much care, are also ruined.

H. How so?

S. If a man is to give additional training to a well trained horse, he is apt, without being able to account for it, to get the idea that the horse is not going well enough, and that the rider feeling heretofore experienced is not the correct one. Thus he is taught to play at equerry, to "*kniebeln*," to work backward, when it would be well to reward the horse for its accomplishments by leaving it alone. The man is therefore taught something wrong—to mistrain instead of to ride.

H. I cannot rid myself of the idea that it will be quite necessary for many horses to be gone over again thoroughly during the winter.

S. You express there a truth in exact form. Some horses need it very much, but not all of them. Hence, in individual riding of squads of old men on old horses during winter, those alone which need it should be bent to it by preparatory exercises or any other means you may choose, but never all the horses, nor should bunglers over be placed on horses to be retained, but on the contrary the very best riders. Those lessons should be applied which tend to eradicate the difficulties named. The training should, however, not be "*en bloc*," nor should the whole squad be put through all of the second part of the riding instructions. Least of all, should the two illustrations of the presentation of a squad for inspection, which are given on pages 195 and 196, be worked into a scheme "F," in conformity to which the whole year's work is regulated, and for which coaching is done *ad nauseam*, as you may frequently observe during the last few months. Whatever riders may be detailed to train, to bend, should train and bend if they know how, but only where it is necessary. Whoever is not ordered to train or does not know how, should leave it alone and simply ride, or learn how to ride properly, of which he would probably stand in need.

H. You would not, then, permit the riders of the late first riding class, *i. e.*, now the smaller squads of the second riding class, to work their horses all over again during the winter as advocated by SCHMIDT.

S. I entirely disagree with SCHMIDT on that point. The riders of the (late) first riding class should not be allowed to do any training. Those alone who are sufficiently progressed may be instructed how to train. It is conceivable that toward the end of the first year of his service some recruit may prove suitable, if he has learned riding before his entry in the service, or has special ability. Whoever at the end of the first year of service is relegated into the (late) first riding class should never be permitted to train, simply because he cannot do it. I mentioned to you once before that SCHMIDT's greatness consisted rather in his ability as drill master of large bodies than in correct views on the details of training.

H. I was told that he was so infinitely zealous and indefatigable as to forget everything else. It is said of him that as regimental commander he once had his trumpeters ride in the hall, got warmed up, and remained in the hall until late in the evening, entirely forgetting a party he had invited to his house for the evening.

S. It is wrong in itself to become so interested and forgetful as to remain so many hours in the hall with the same squad. Any expert rider knows that one or two horses may be ruined in this

manner in a single day, in fact, more easily so than if there had been drill twice as long in the open.

H. I am curious to know how you wish the winter riding of the older men on the older horses managed, when they are doubly divided, into a squadron of two platoons in double rank, or four platoons in single rank, and also in squads, each under its riding instructor.

S. Not at all differently from the service method observed by the squadron during the summer, when the special service is prescribed for it; it would drill as a unit, practice individual riding under the supervision of the squad riding instructors, or make the proof of the example by a short ride within the square. The difference would chiefly be this, that during the winter the drill in the school of the squadron would not be so frequent and long as in summer, though during the latter the squadron commander would also have to consider every day as lost for his riders on which they have not practiced their horses in individual riding. One or two drills per week with the whole squadron would suffice in winter, drills lasting not more than half an hour, and taking place before or after the squadron is divided up among the squad instructors.

H. Would you arrange the squads according to the efficiency of man and horse?

S. In the manner heretofore pursued by all intelligent squadron commanders. The average number of riders in the same squad depends on the number of remounts received each year, which is thirteen.

H. Thus you get eleven riding squads, each of twelve or thirteen horses. Of these squads the remounts constitute two, *i. e.*, the old and young remounts; the recruits form three; leaving six squads, among which the seventy older horses would be divided. On what basis would you assign them to the other riders?

S. In the first place, I would give the old remounts of the year just preceding to the oldest and most expert remount riders, to be ridden in addition to the young remounts, unless they have lagged behind, and are to undergo another course of training with this year's old remounts. That may be the case with weakly horses and such as are behind in their bodily development; it is less apt to be the case the more the old remounts of the year just preceding were spared during the great summer exercises. To this squad should also be assigned the horse or horses of older contingents, which have been spoiled during the summer by poor riding, and need a thorough retraining. Some of them may have to be specially taken in hand

by themselves. The longer, however, the squadrons adhere to these principles, the fewer will be the horses of older contingents which need retraining. Specially well developed and firmly going horses of last year's old remounts may, on the contrary, be placed in the next higher squad.

H. The second squad of older riders would then probably consist of the junior half of the twenty-six remount riders, which squad would train the old remounts of the current year, and mount those horses also which had been old remounts in the past year but one.

S. Something like that, though there may be special exceptions; for instance, if some horse of the old remounts of two years ago should show such firm training as to make it available as a recruit horse. In its place the squad might take charge of a horse of the older contingents which needs retraining, but not to the same extent as the horse assigned to the first squad of remount riders.

H. You assumed two, or at the most, four horses as requiring retraining.

S. Apparently, yes; in fact, however, it is different. Most of the horses requiring retraining will usually be found among the old remounts of one or two years ago, and are therefore counted in among those horses which are ridden by the twenty-six best riders of the squadron in the third or fourth year of service. Having been carefully trained for four years by the best riders of the squadron, I should think the horses ought to be so firm that they cannot be easily spoiled by unskillful riders. Horses are usually spoiled by awkward riders through stupid "*kniebeln*" and training, because non-expert riders do not know how, when and where to train. If great care is taken, as I have explained, that the recruits and the poor riders among the older men ride only with correct seat, refrain from all "*kniebeln*" and training by rein, never hang on by the reins or give any aids by them but for the purpose of getting the horse lightly up to the bit, none of the older horses once thoroughly trained is apt to be spoiled so as to need retraining.

H. To what riders would you assign the next older horses, which have been more than four years with the squadron?

S. Among the horses of the earlier contingents which are in their fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth years of service, the best trained and freshest are to be found. Exceptionally some horses may remain fresh on their legs for a longer period, just as they may lose in freshness at an earlier period. With these exceptions the contingents named will probably contain the horses from which the recruit horses may and should be selected.

H. From these five contingents, *i. e.*, more than sixty horses, you would select the thirty-nine best for the recruits?

S. The best trained and which, at the same time, are perfectly fresh on their legs. In order that the recruit may gain a perfectly correct rider feeling, it is necessary that he do not receive his first training on a numb or stiff horse. As to the degree of training, it is necessary that his horse be thoroughly trained and obedient to aids of thigh. It must obey the thigh in order that it may respond when the rider is to be taught how to gather the horse for an active gait. No fear need be entertained lest the horse lose its obedience to the thigh through its employment as a recruit horse; for it remains in practice in point of obedience to thigh, since the recruit must constantly use his thigh in riding the turnings, as well as the gait ordered, thus preserving the horse's obedience. The instructor should carefully see to it that the recruit rides with his thigh. Otherwise obedience may be converted into disobedience, the horses become hard, pull and bolt. If retraining becomes necessary, it should be entrusted to the most expert men, never to recruits.

H. I suppose you wish to have the same principles for selecting the horses carried out in the case of those of last year's recruits who, for some reason, are behindhand in their training and have to be reassigned to the recruit squad for retraining. Not many horses are needed for this purpose. If I remember right, there were but two or three such men on an average.

S. At present, when all the older men are assigned to the second riding class and only such of last year's recruits as are behindhand are to be assigned to the first riding class, the advisability becomes apparent of extending this regulation to a greater number of men. They are habitually formed into a separate riding squad, ranging from ten to thirteen horses.

H. If this squad "rides with the recruits," you will have to deduct them from the squadron, since they cannot turn out with it in the current year when the small squadron is formed for drill.

S. Why not? They have drilled with the squadron during the past summer. I might distribute them at first among the recruit squads as leaders, to give the recruits a certain support until the latter no longer fall off and can guide their horses to some extent. After that it would be better to combine these recruits of last year's contingent, who are riding with the new recruits, in a separate squad.

H. It is true they are ahead of the recruits by six weeks of additional training between the conclusion of the fall maneuvers and the beginning of November, since the recruits do not arrive

until November 1st, and hardly get on horseback before November 6th or 7th.

S. There are six precious weeks during which they can learn much to rid themselves of defects which have become apparent during their first year of service. Soon after the arrival of the recruits they will probably again be fit to ride with saddle and stirrup, which does not preclude that during those six weeks they turn out with saddle and stirrup on those days when the squadron commander wants to drill in the school of the squadron for half an hour.

H. How would you make up the last riding squads, all of which, under the new riding instructions, belong to the second riding class?

S. Here I will begin at the bottom. The horses still remaining will, with some exceptions of course, be, in the main, the oldest in the squadron. From them I select those which show signs of numbness, and seem, therefore, candidates for condemnation. On these older horses I let those of the older men ride alternately, who, according to our calculation, do not ride every day on account of other service (tradesmen, kitchen police, etc.). The remaining old horses I assign to the remaining older men according to their temper, degree of training, and skill in riding, forming them in two squads, on the principle that each man retains his horse.

H. Where do the non-commissioned officers who are not remount riders, and the trumpeters ride?

S. Wherever they belong according to their skill in riding.

H. Horses and men would then be grouped about as follows:

1. Young remounts (contingent 1) under the best riders; thirteen horses.
2. Old remounts (contingent 2) under the remaining remount riders; thirteen horses.
3. Last year's old remounts (contingent 3) under the riders under first heading; thirteen horses.
4. Old remounts of two years ago (contingent 4) under the riders under second heading; thirteen horses.
- 5, 6 and 7. Recruits on horses selected from contingents 5 to 9; twelve to fourteen horses per squad.
8. Last year's recruits for additional training with this year's recruits on horses like those in squads 5 to 7, each ten to thirteen horses.
- 9 and 10. Older men on older horses; ten to thirteen horses per squad.
11. Men who do not ride daily, on horses which will probably be condemned at the next inspection; ten to thirteen horses.

S. That would about express the principle to be followed. I must add, however, that any exception should be made which circumstances, skill in riding, degree of training, etc., render necessary.

H. In the Hussar regiment of the division which I commanded

there was a squadron which took particular pride in being able to let the third and fourth contingent of remounts, each in a separate squad, ride in the second class.

S. It shows that very good principles were observed there.

H. On all occasions the squadron showed the highest efficiency in riding. One thing I did not approve of was to make up the squads according to the color of the horses.

S. That is a hobby in which those only can indulge who have no idea of riding.

H. Now that we have made up the double skeleton, which we consider proper for the older horses in the squadron during winter, I would like to ask you for information on the subject of the kind of service which is to form the continuation of the training of these older men. We have seventy horses, which for riding in squads and for individual riding are divided into squads, numbers 3 and 4, 8, 9, 10 and 11, and form a squadron of two double rank platoons or four single rank platoons of eleven, twelve, or thirteen files.

S. It will not often be practicable to form thirteen files, for of the non-commissioned officers we only leave the recruit instructors and those detached at home, and all the trumpeters turn out as such unless they are still riding with the recruits. There are also some detached horses. Only thirteen files could be formed if no horses were sick. That is immaterial, however.

H. When and how frequently does the squadron turn out and drill as such?

S. I would make it obligatory to turn out twice a week for drill and once for field service.

H. The time available for confirming the riding would thus be shortened one-half.

S. Not at all. The troop commander should not drill all day. He may drill for half an hour in the school of the squadron, and then break up the squadron into riding squads for individual riding. One-half hour twice a week suffices to keep the principles of the drill inculcated in the squadron during the summer fresh in the mind. Nor need field exercises be carried to the exhaustion of the horses. This service may terminate on the drill ground, where individual riding may then be added. I lay great stress on having individual riding every day. I again remind you of the Great King's words: "The day on which the rider has not exercised (*tummeln*) his horse is lost to him." It may be that in October, when some of the officers' problems of field service have yet to be



solved, the individual riding cannot be had on such days. They should be counted as field days of the formed squadron.

H. In this individual riding, would you have riding in squads with distances?

S. Sometimes it must be had; in all cases, however, merely as proof of the example, and for controlling the gaits.

H. I see another difficulty in the way of carrying out this measure; it is the equipment of man and horse. If all or part of the horses had to be ridden on the snaffle, or if the recruits undergoing additional training, ride on the blanket, they cannot be taken out for drill, because they need the curb.

S. Drill movements can easily be executed with horses on the snaffle. The squadron commander will have to select his evolutions accordingly. As regards the last recruits who resume riding on the blanket, it will do them no harm to ride on those days with saddle and stirrup, as they have drilled before.

H. And on the other days of the week you would simply have riding in the open?

S. And individual riding whenever practicable; the horses are to be exercised (*tummeln*).

H. When in the fall would you begin this kind of exercise of the older men?

S. The very day after our return from the maneuvers.

H. Would you give no day of rest to the horses at all?

S. No. I consider these pauses, which sometimes extend over four or five weeks in September or October, quite harmful to the older horses. It is a tradition not older than this century, that after great exertions horses should have a rest for some time. For five long months in winter, from November to March, inclusive, the horses are tormented one hour five times per week in the unhealthy atmosphere of the hall, and an effort is made to get a hay-belly on them, so that they may look fat. With weight thus increased, without development of muscles to carry the horse, they are introduced to the fatigues of the spring drill period. They thus become more fatigued than their poorly developed muscles are capable of withstanding. The hay-belly disappears, they run down, not the least as the result of the excitement and nervousness engendered by faulty training and treatment. At the termination of the squadron drill period a few weeks rest is considered necessary to fatten them up again. They are exercised daily for a half an hour, or perhaps ridden as far as the target range. This period of rest is followed by that of regimental, brigade and division drill and maneuvers, in

which again more is demanded from the horses than the poorly developed muscles and fat lungs can bear. They return from the maneuvers fairly collapsed. Again they are given a rest for some weeks, only again to begin the winter duties in an unhealthy condition. What is the result? Great exertions cause the fat, untrained lungs to become diseased. Those horses which emerge from these great exertions well, though fatigued, develop a terrible appetite during the first few subsequent days. They eat hastily, and during their time of rest do not get sufficient exercise to regularly digest the food. Thence arise diseases of the digestive organs of a typhoid character, *i. e.*, influenza, which is both epidemic and endemic in character.

H. Once before you referred to the fact that our system of service was producing influenza.

S. And I pointed out at the same time that during the past century in the most flourishing period of cavalry under FREDERICK THE GREAT, influenza was entirely unknown. The reason was that the King insisted on every horse having at least two hours' exercise each day.

H. If the horse does not accumulate fat in the lungs, and at the same time has its muscles strengthened daily by rational exercise, great exertions will not tell on it so much as when it enters a period of severe fatigue in fat condition, without muscles or training, and more particularly so if it be in constant conflict with the rider who "*kniebels*" and mistrains it senselessly, and makes it nervous. But at no time is it more in need of two hours of exercise in the open than when passing from a period of fatigue to one of comparative rest.

S. For these reasons I consider it advisable to give each horse at least two hours of exercise in the open air as prescribed by the Great King. I would like to include even Sunday.

H. It would be contrary to our ideas of keeping the Sabbath.

S. Does not the cook cook on Sunday? Does not the domestic wait on you Sunday and blacken your boots? Must not the horse be fed and groomed on Sunday? It is not necessary to drill on Sunday, but as far as permitted by their health, the horses might be taken out for a steady walk early on Sunday morning, before grooming, if you wish, or before or after church.

H. If you consider daily exercise in the open necessary, you would at no time consign your recruits and remounts to the hall.

S. It is admittedly a great evil that the requirements of training drive these sixty-six horses into the hall whenever the weather pre-

cludes instruction in the open; hence I would not let these horses use the hall whenever it can be at all avoided. But I fail to see why I should willfully allow this evil to affect the older men on the older horses when it can be avoided. I am of the opinion that during the winter these seventy horses should not be permitted to set foot in the hall.

H. How will you ride in the open when the weather forbids?

S. Did the winter ever prevent us from riding in the open during the War of 1870-71? We had to do it, and did not allow ourselves to be prevented. The times are long past when both parties went into winter quarters at the appearance of winter, and resumed active operations at the opening of the spring.

H. It is true we had a winter campaign in 1814; in 1864 we began a war in the midst of winter, and in 1870-71 an unusually severe winter failed to interrupt active operations on our part. In most recent times the Russians crossed the Balkans in the worst winter weather. In the winter campaign, however, we do not care for loss of material, so long as it brings in fair returns. Nor should we forget that the action of cavalry was very much limited in such weather.

S. Unfortunately, yes; and chiefly why? Because it had no experience in overcoming the difficulties connected with winter weather. A number of splendid days can always be found in winter, on which it is simply delightful to ride in the open. When frost has made the newly fallen snow into a kind of loose sand, the practice grounds are fit for use; nor does the farmer object or send in a bill of damages when we ride over his fields. We then have all the better opportunities to use the terrain for field exercises than during the summer or fall after the harvest, for under modern conditions of husbandry the harvest is no sooner brought in than the ground is at once ploughed and sowed anew. In your letters on infantry you have pointed out yourself how many days this arm can use in winter for field exercises; so can the cavalry. As regards sparing the horses, I would not demand that in winter weather we ride in the open as long in peace time as we are compelled to in war.

H. There are times in winter when the practice grounds are frozen so hard that we can ride at a walk at the best, and even thus lame some horses. On such days the plowed and cultivated fields become so rough and inaccessible that, if we enter upon them, we may be reasonably sure of breaking some horses' legs. Nor are the fields covered with snow all winter. The farmer will render a bill for damages if we ride over his sowed fields during frost.

S. At such times I would make practice marches with the squadron of seventy horses, or, still better, with the whole regiment of five such squadrons.

H. The roads are then, as a rule, so smooth that you cannot go riding at all.

S. It is a misfortune that we do not learn how to ride on ice. It would be a fine testimonial for cavalry, indeed, to state by way of excuse that frost and ice prevented it from pursuing and patrolling during war. We must learn how to ride on a smooth surface. A steady seat, deep and firm in the saddle, coolness, confidence to the horse which itself feels uneasy and needs assistance from the rider, guiding by the snaffle, horses' heads straight to front, low position of hand, which should be particularly steady when the horse slips, a specially short gait in trot—the dog trot—these are the rules to be observed. Horse and man must, however, be practiced in them, if they are to carry them out in war. Riding on smoothly frozen ground should not be continued too long at a time, as it is very hard on the tendons; the dog trot is apt to make the joints stiff. A livelier gait should therefore be assumed the moment soft ground is reached. Sharp calkins should be used. We have a very good kind of adjustable calkins. Do you believe the men will use them properly in war unless they have been taught their correct use in peace? Not even our farriers would learn how to adjust them if we did not use them every winter. There are many special matters to be taken into consideration. The calkins are manufactured in bulk and kept in store; the farrier punches the hole in the shoe, the calkin may not go in, or may fall out. I have seen such things myself. If the farriers are inexperienced they will not know how to handle them. The men, on the other hand, should know how to change the dull for the sharp calkin when the ground calls for a change. Otherwise the sharp calkin may speedily become dull on hard, rough roads, and useless.

H. When it is very cold I suppose you will not insist on individual riding, for you said yourself when we discussed the training of the recruits, that with stiff fingers they would not profit much from riding in the open.

S. When it is cold and the riding grounds are frozen so hard and rough that I am obliged to relinquish individual riding, I would simply make practice marches until the weather changes. Just think how much is gained for the warlike efficiency of the men by drilling twice a week during winter, if but half an hour each time, and by having one field exercise a week. That will make—

I calculate on one month during the winter when the weather will make drill and individual riding impracticable, and my figure is high—twenty-one weeks, *i. e.*, forty-two drill days and twenty-one field exercises between October 1st and April 1st, and includes besides a month of practice marches.

H. During the month devoted to practice marches because the cold prevents other exercises, many noses, ears, and feet will be frozen.

S. For what do we have overcoats with hoods and gloves? The soldier should learn how to defend himself against cold, otherwise he will succumb to it in war. He must also learn how to ride with his overcoat on. He must be practiced in wrapping the stirrups with straw; in war there is no time to learn it. If the available means are put to use, there is no need of freezing. On the contrary, such a ride in the open makes one feel good.

H. There are days when the snow balls. I have seen horses go on stilts, as it were, and fall. That would put a stop to riding.

S. In that case I would not ride.

H. Might you not in this way be obliged to leave the seventy old horses of the squadron in the stable for days and weeks at a time?

S. No. Do mail and other public conveyances stop their service for days and weeks on account of the elements? Where the mail and hackmen can get through the trained cavalryman will.

H. Mail and hackmen must under circumstances risk the loss of their horses in peace, the cavalry should only do so in war.

S. For these reasons I admit that there may be days in which it is impossible to ride the horses. But there will not be many successive days of such weather.

H. Sometimes a cold spell will last quite a while.

S. Whenever the cold is such that drilling in the open is forbidden by regulations (more than ten degrees below zero, Reaumur), it is preferable to take the horses out on the roads for half an hour of exercise, rather than confine them to the hall and encroach on its use by the remounts and recruits.

H. Are you not afraid, lest mere horse exercise make man and horse slouchy?

S. They are not to be permitted to become slouchy. Many practical exercises may be combined with this horse exercise. Properly utilized it will greatly benefit the squadron. There is in the first place the riding in the long marching column, requiring much care on the part of the men and great uniformity of gait. It

is a good preparation for drill, and may be practiced for its own sake, for on it depends the success of a charge on emerging from a defile. The men's proper bearing must not suffer during horse exercise. On the country roads, no less than on the riding grounds, squad leaders are responsible that the men do not slouch. Supervision over the position is a prerequisite for the attainment of good marching discipline. Horse exercise affords a better opportunity for it than the hall. And the better the marching discipline, the more sabers before the enemy.

H. How far do you mean to promote the art of riding, as such, in the several riding squads into which the seventy horses, continuing as a squadron throughout winter, are divided?

S. The riding instructions prescribe that recruits who lag behind, ride according to the first part of the riding instructions. That gives our limit, and refers to the squad which we called No. 8. The remaining squads, Nos. 3, 4, 9, 10 and 11, are to be trained in accordance with the principles of the second part of the riding instructions, for they belong in the second riding class.

H. These five squads should then be able, in the end, to go the side paces on the double trail, and shortened gaits.

S. That would certainly be contrary to the red thread which runs throughout the riding instructions, and against their express wording. It is stated there, that progress should conform to the bodily development of the horse. A badly ridden side pace on the double trail will ever be injurious to it. The instructions state further and expressly, that there are horses which will never be able to go the higher paces, as I mentioned several times. They should, therefore, be omitted with such horses. The insight of the riding instructor and squadron commander is to decide in each case, whether or when a horse may be trained in them. Let us begin with the squads of older horses to which the best riders belong, that is, according to our division, with the remount riders on older horses, which we called squads 3 and 4. In squad 3, *i. e.*, among the horses which were old remounts during the past year, horses will be found which may be bent sideward so far that the two hoof prints separate (double trail). It will be possible so to shorten their gaits with hindhand well under, as to approach the shortened school pace. Horses will also be found among them with such conformation that the higher side paces should never be; others with which they may not yet be begun.

H. Hence the greater number of horses on which the higher paces may be ridden and illustrated will be found in Squad No. 4,

i. e., of remount riders on horses, which, on the average, are in their fourth year of service.

S. Yes; if the remount riders in Squad No. 4 were as good riders as those in Squad No. 3. We should not forget that in Squad No. 4 the less experienced trainers are riding, and for that reason be more cautious in the rate of progress and demands.

H. You would in no case make fixed demands on these two squads.

S. Yes, I would. I make the fixed demand that each rider individual (man and horse) be so far (and no farther) advanced in the art of riding as is beneficial to the horse and intelligible to the rider. This degree of progress in the side paces on the double trail consists in the distance between footprints (from zero to the normal of one pace), and in the shortened trot in the degree to which the hindhand is brought under, which carries the forehand more or less. Under no consideration would I ever have the high school paces (side paces on the double trail and completely shortened paces) practiced in squads, but merely by those riders and horses which are sufficiently advanced. That holds good for all the riding squads of the squadron, for the degree of shortened gait which a horse can go varies. None could show its greatest proficiency in squads with distances, because it must conform to the gait of its leader. The very best horses cannot go side paces on the double trail in squads, and observe distance at the same time, for depending on circumstances, the rider might have to urge and increase the gait just when the horse's gait would call for "half position," or to rein in when the horse's gait would call for urging. I believe I developed that idea once before; but I am obliged to repeat, if I am to precisely define the demands to be made.



## THE OFFICER'S PATROL.

BY LIEUTENANT EDWARD D. ANDERSON, FOURTH CAVALRY, U. A. ARMY.

"I cannot refrain from here making a statement, which sounds like a paradox; namely, that in many, even in most cases, a simple officer's patrol reconnoiters better and sees more than an entire squadron or an even stronger detachment of cavalry."—*Hohenlohe*.

THE first step towards a military success is to know where the enemy is, what his forces are, and what he is doing. Informed upon these points, it is an easy matter for the commander to make his plans, which if not the best, are at least appropriate to the circumstances. It is necessary for the general to base his measures upon many uncertainties, and this makes command very difficult. His decisions cannot be made lightly, for their consequences are of great gravity, as upon them may perhaps depend the safety of his army, as well as his own professional advancement or ruin.

The movements of the enemy are enveloped in a semi-obscurity, and it devolves upon the cavalry screening the advance of the army to prevent this obscurity from changing into utter darkness. The cavalry must, therefore, put forth both its physical and intellectual efforts to lift the veil which covers the dispositions of the enemy, and it must furnish most of the information upon which the general will outline his action. Though the sources of his information may be many, such as agents, spies, prisoners, and reports of his secret service men, the greater part of it is obtained by his own officers, *i. e.*, the most advanced *antennae* of the cavalry screen—officers' patrols.

History teems with instances of the invaluable service rendered by these important threads of the military fabric. Several officers, who rode fearlessly between the different corps of the French army on the 24th, 25th, and 26th of August, 1870, determined without doubt the direction of MACMAHON's march. An officer's patrol brought the first news of the retreat of the French on August 12th.

GOEBEN decided to carry out the concentration which led to the battle of St. Quentin solely on the report of a single officer's patrol that had pushed boldly to the front. It is well known that the plans of the German army were based upon the famous reconnaissance which Major VON UNGER made on July 2, 1866.

NAPIER gives the following graphic description of Captain WILLIAM LIGHT's dashing reconnaissance during the Peninsular War: "One of these bodies (of the enemy) was posted on a hill, the end of which abutted on the high road, the slope being clothed with trees, and defended by skirmishers; it was essential to know whether a small or a large force thus barred the way, but all who endeavored to ascertain the fact were stopped by the fire of the enemy. At last, Captain WILLIAM LIGHT, distinguished by the variety of his attainments, an artist, musician, mechanist, seaman, and soldier, made the trial. He rode forward as if he would force his way through the French skirmishers, but in the wood dropped his reins, and leaned back as if badly wounded, his horse appeared to canter wildly along the front of the enemy's light troops, and they, thinking him mortally hurt, ceased their fire and took no further notice. He thus passed unobserved through the wood to the other side of the hill where there were no skirmishers and, ascending to the open summit above, galloped along the French main line, counting their regiments as he passed. His sudden appearance, his blue undress, his daring confidence, and his speed, made the French doubt if he was an enemy, and a few shots only were discharged; but he, dashing along the opposite declivity, broke from the rear through the very skirmishers whose fire he had essayed in front, and reaching the spot where WELLINGTON stood, told him there were but five battalions on the hill." These are only a few of the instances that might be mentioned.

The operation of war, which, of all others, permits a young officer to employ his military aptitudes, is the officer's patrol. An officer detailed on this duty emerges, for the time being, from the realms of tactics and becomes a strategist on a small scale. He must, therefore, have a certain knowledge of the details of war.

*Composition and Use.*—The officer's patrol is used most extensively in connection with the cavalry screen. This, however, is not its exclusive field. In our service, the officer's patrol consists of one or more officers alone, or an officer and a few men, both men and horses being especially selected. Many patrols will be sent forward from the different contact squadrons of the screen, and these will be composed of such officers as are available at those points, but for special and important missions the commander of

the screen, or of the army, will entrust their execution to officers recommended by their regimental commanders as possessing those qualities which make them the most fitted to undertake them. If an escort or orderlies are necessary, the officer to undertake the mission is generally allowed to select, from the troops to which he belongs, men mounted upon good strong horses upon whom he knows he can depend. The officer, if possible, should speak the language of the enemy, if it differs from his own.

*Their Duties and Instructions.*—The duties which officer's patrols in our service will be called upon to perform, are: To obtain information of the enemy's position, strength and movements; to reconnoiter particular localities; and to establish connections with or carry dispatches to a distant force.

When an officer receives an order to make a patrol, he must be sufficiently informed upon the intentions of the superior who sends him, if these intentions are not generally known, and whether or not it is desired to keep them secret. This knowledge is indispensable to him, in order that he may be able, from among the observations he will have occasion to make, to distinguish those which are important from those which are not.

The Service in Campaign of the German army, says: "A subordinate officer will be able to distinguish more easily a piece of information of value, from one without importance, when he has been well instructed as to the intentions of his chief." Also, "\* \* \* the officer must be as far as possible informed of the situation of the enemy, and the plans of the commander." Consequently, the commander of a division of cavalry screening the front of an army would not order the commanders of the contact regiments to send such or such number of patrols, but would order them to send a certain number of officers to report to him, and he would himself give them their instructions.

If any one of these officers does not fully understand the intentions of his general, or any particular point of his instructions, he should, before taking his departure, clear up the point by questions addressed to the general himself, to his chief of staff, or an aide-de-camp.

Let us suppose that an officer knows only that his division is to march in a certain direction. When he is making his patrol, he perceives some patrols of the enemy upon a line of railroad that he is exploring. As these are simple patrols, and as they have been in the vicinity of the army and have been reported before, he does not think it necessary to inform his commander at once, and reserves

the mentioning of it until his next report. Now, his division has been ordered and had intended to occupy this railroad and cover it. The appearance of the enemy's patrols was, therefore, to his commander, a fact of great importance. The general will then receive this piece of news too late, because he has not communicated his intentions to this officer's patrol. The chief would have still less reason to keep from the patrols what he knows of the enemy's movements, than he would have to keep secret his own designs. The better instructed an officer is before starting, the more quickly he will collect useful information, for in advance he can represent to himself the position of the enemy, and from his map recognize the points from which he could have an extended view of the country occupied by his adversary, and those from which he could likely approach his first lines, or perhaps traverse them.

All instructions should be committed to memory and papers containing information of value to the enemy should not be carried. Most of the orders for reconnaissances are given after some knowledge is already possessed of the enemy, and have for their purpose the extension of this knowledge. The "Service in Campaign" says: "Officers' patrols should not be given invariable directions, or a fixed itinerary, but they must clearly see the points towards which their missions are directed." If the forces occupying a certain point are desired, the instructions would be: "Find what force of the enemy are in S." The officer is thus hampered by no iron-clad instructions, and is bound to no particular route, but is left to accomplish his mission in the way that his genius, ingenuity, and sagacity may show him is best. Furthermore, orders given in this precise manner are the most easily executed, for the reason that the officer then knows precisely what to do, and they bring better results than general instructions to go out and bring in information of the enemy.

It may be necessary to impose the itinerary in certain cases, and, where this is done, the officer must of course conform to it. Before contact is gained with the enemy, the patrols sent out are assigned to each of the main routes, and they must follow them until contact is obtained.

*Gait to be Taken.*—Time is of great value in war, and the officer must accommodate the gait of his horse to the circumstances of the case and the importance of his mission. In going to the zone of observation he should, if possible, avoid any region infected by the enemy's patrols or inhabited by a hostile population. This precaution will allow him to move rapidly to the point where his

operations are to begin. If he has previous knowledge of the enemy, he can calculate accurately enough where his safety is assured, but having no such knowledge, he will generally move rapidly until he sees the first patrol of the enemy, or until the attitude of the inhabitants indicates the proximity of the enemy. Beyond these points commensurate care is necessary. The general will sometimes prescribe the gait to be taken.

*Sure and Dangerous Zones.*—The terrain towards the enemy may, therefore, be divided into a sure zone and a dangerous one. In the sure zone, the pace may be from seven to ten miles per hour. The patrol's comparative safety in this zone must not, however, be an excuse for violating the invariable rule of carefully seaching the new horizon before emerging from a wood or village, or descending from a height into an unexplored valley. Three steps too many may cause the officer in charge to lose his party, to discover himself to the enemy, or to compromise the success of his mission. If not alone, the officer should always send forward one or two men as a point. If his party is large enough, its dispositions should be similar to those of the main army. The duties of these advance, rear, and flanking parties, are the same as those of other patrols.

When the dangerous zone is reached, the usual routes of communication will be given up for those less frequented, or the advance will be across country, or under cover, a few yards to the right or left of the main road. The advance is more cautious, and a rapid glance at the horizon is now not sufficient. Every fold of ground should be separately and carefully examined. A pair of good field glasses is indispensable for this work. Some officers seem to be naturally endowed with the faculty of discovering anything unusual at a glance, others have to search long and diligently before they discover the enemy, while others never find anything, whether they search or not. After assuring himself that the horizon is clear, the officer should take advantage of his commanding position to select his route to the culminating point following. Failing in this precaution, he may, after advancing a short distance, emerge from cover and be compelled to advance in an absolutely open terrain.

*What Should be Reported.*—The first detachment of the enemy which the patrol will meet will, as a rule, be one of his patrols. What then would he do? Would he report it? Not always. If he had seen nothing else during the journey, he would report it in the evening as the result of his expedition. But if his instructions had said that the enemy was in the vicinity of S, and he had seen some

detachments in this direction, and some patrols at points unmentioned, he would not fail to report this fact at once. But, as a general thing, patrols will not be reported, except at the beginning of the campaign, or when contact has been lost for some time. In these cases the appearance of the first patrol of the enemy becomes an important fact. Whether or not a fact should be reported should be left to the intelligence of the officer and the logic of the facts. A rule could not be prescribed that would cover every case.

*Reports.*—The "Service in Campaign" of the German army requires all reports to be sent upon blanks of the following form :

	5 mm.	40 mm.	50 mm.	10 mm.	10 mm.	25 mm.
20 mm.	SENDER, No. ....	FROM WHERE SENT.	DAY.	MONTH.	HR., MIN., A. M. OR P. M.	
180 mm.	To	Received				

The sender fills all spaces except time received. The officer to whom sent will fill in the time of arrival. Under "Sender" will not be written the sender's name, but the name of his expedition, as "Officer's Patrol from the Sixth Cavalry upon the Village S."

The number of the report must not be forgotten. It will enable the receiver to know sometimes that a report has been lost, and will thereby facilitate his understanding a succeeding report, which, without a knowledge of this accident, might be incomprehensible. It is well, however, when one report is based upon the one preceding to recall succinctly its purport, as "The troops mentioned in my report No. 2 (one regiment of infantry, two troops of cavalry) are marching towards Kickapoo."

The point "From Where Sent," should be given with reference to an inhabited place or a well known landmark. This permits the receiver to orient himself quickly, and he at once knows the distance that the patrol has traveled, where it actually is, or the terrain it has occupied or reconnoitered. He can then decide whether or not it is necessary to send out new patrols. The moment of departure is, however, of most importance. Where a report takes several hours to reach its destination, it loses half its value if the time when the information was taken is not recorded. The information is not exact at the moment when received on account of the

events transpiring while it is on its way. But, if the receiver knows the hour at which it was sent, he can, by calculating the time and inspecting the map, change the situation to correspond with the present.

The superscription will be simple. The report proper should be clearly and legibly written, and should be scrupulously accurate as to facts. Proper names should be carefully spelled. The length of the report, however, demands some reflection. A wise man once said: "As I have not the time to write you a short letter, I write you a long one." Brevity is desirable, but not at the expense of clearness.

The instructions of the "Service in Campaign" encourage officers to express in their reports personal opinions and impressions; and, indeed, they may be of value. There is no reason to suppose that a general will allow himself to be led away on a false maneuver upon the advice of a lieutenant. At the end of the report is written the name and grade of the sender.

*Conduct in Presence of the Enemy.*—A question more difficult to solve than that of the report is the course of conduct when the enemy's patrols are sighted. The officer in command must remember that he is after information and must avoid a skirmish, but if he can exterminate the enemy's patrol by throwing his party upon it, thus rendering his route free, the attack would not be a bad operation. In an exceptionally propitious case, an enemy's patrol, after being repulsed, could be followed in its retreat without falling into the enemy's hands, and a glimpse of his advanced line obtained. This, however, is extremely risky. Once a patrol's presence is discovered to the enemy, its movements are hampered, and it cannot freely follow the route it had chosen to accomplish its end. It would be better to seek concealment till the enemy has passed and then proceed undiscovered.

*Strength of the Patrol.*—The strength of the detachment will vary in different cases. If several reports are to be rendered, that many couriers will be necessary. In traversing a hostile country, or one infected by the enemy's patrols, the courier will need an escort in returning with the information obtained. There are many cases where an officer can best accomplish his mission alone.

BREDOW, in the "History of the Ninth Hussars," says: "Lieutenant BLANKENSEE, belonging to a regiment of Canneberg dragoons, which was surrounded, resolved to pierce the enemy's line and seek reinforcements at a neighboring cantonment, with the aid of which they hoped to escape the next day. The Colonel gave him his best horse,



and, after being forced to return the first time, he made a second attempt, and succeeded in passing the line. He had to cross a marsh, to swim his horse across a deep stream, and to climb some dangerous heights beyond; but notwithstanding all these difficulties, he arrived happily at Trappan, and obtained the desired aid; his regiment was rescued after a brilliant fight, and he received a squadron as his reward."

The same history recounts the brilliant exploit of Lieutenant BLUMENTHAL, who had carried an order to General KETTLER near Dijon. After delivering the order, and while returning, he was assailed by some franc-tireurs. His horse was shot and fell upon his leg. He thought himself lost, but finally succeeded in extricating his imprisoned leg by parting with his boot. The French pursued, but he escaped, and after a long march, one foot bootless, was picked up by a patrol of the Eleventh Dragoons.

*General Considerations.*—An officer on this service must be prepared for any contingency. When he perceives an enemy's patrol he will avoid collision, and try to accomplish his ends by taking a new direction if necessary. A new itinerary, the seeking of a hiding-place, a forced march, a march at night, and above all, a good horse, will deliver him, if he has no bad luck, from the consequences of a bad step. There are two cases where the enemy's patrols should, if possible, be attacked: First, when they are discovered upon the point of obtaining a knowledge of your movements or position; and, second, when the opportunity of capturing the whole patrol presents itself. An especially appropriate occasion for the latter case is when rejoining after accomplishing its own mission.

It is always important to make prisoners, for from them can generally be learned the names of their chiefs and the positions of the corps to which they belong; but they should be taken incidentally, and no important mission abandoned or interfered with to make the capture.

When the enemy is encountered the real work of the patrol begins. Here no rule of action can be prescribed. The circumstances of the case and the good judgment of the officer in charge must determine its course. But it is only by boldness and coolness that a patrol will be useful in the neighborhood of the enemy.

In the Franco-Prussian War Lieutenant KÖNIG was reconnoitering with a patrol of German cavalry a long way ahead of his army in the enemy's country, and going along a lane to avoid a body of French troops he met a French infantry regiment marching up it.

Escape seemed impossible, but the officer and his four men galloped straight on along the road, and the infantry made way for them almost without noticing them at all, thinking they were some of their own cavalry; they never expected to see any Germans for many days to come.

The same patrol afterwards came across another body of French infantry, and emboldened by their former escape, they quietly rode up to this lot showing a flag of truce, and told them to lay down their arms as they were surrounded. The infantry, supposing from their boldness that this was the case, did so, and moved off to a neighboring village as they were ordered. The patrol then broke up the rifles, burnt them, and rode away. The infantry reported of course that there was a large force of German cavalry there, while in reality, besides this patrol, there was not a German within 100 miles of them.

For such enterprises as these, every man in the patrol must, of course, be full of pluck; and every man must be sharp at finding out information, and finding his way about in a strange country, and this is where it becomes so important for a man to know how to read a map. This knowledge and a compass are indispensable.

Two things go to put pluck in a man; one is confidence in himself, and he can only have this confidence when he knows how to find his way back to his own people, and when he knows that he is on a good horse, and is himself a good enough man for any two of the enemy; the second point is to remember that if he feels any nervousness, his enemy feels just as bad and probably worse.

It is most necessary that when on patrol duty every man should take the greatest care of his horse. It is on this kind of duty that the horse gets twice as much work as on any other kind, and at the same time does not get so regularly fed or groomed. A trooper can never tell when not only his life, but those of his comrades too, may not depend on the speed and amount of energy left in his horse. He should avoid over-riding him, and he should, as often as possible, dismount and give him rest; let him drink a little as often as he can, and give him plenty of food at every convenient opportunity. His horse's feet must be examined frequently and have the best of care.

After the patrol's mission is accomplished, it must rejoin its corps, and the question of route is an important one. The officer in charge can alone judge which one is best. While the road just traversed has the advantage of being known, if it lies through a hostile population, or if the country is infested by patrols of the

enemy, there will always be danger of capture when it is chosen. As a general rule a different route will be selected for returning.

To be successful in this field, an officer must join cunning to bravery, and prudence to audacity. Always solicitous, always surrounded by danger which he must foresee and surmount, he will acquire in a short time an experience of the details of war which an officer serving with his troop will rarely obtain, because the latter is always under the influence of a superior authority who directs all his movements.

No branch of the service gives so many occasions for a young officer to distinguish himself as the service of the officer's patrol.

## THE SIEGE OF CHITRAL.

BY LIEUTENANT C. G. STEWART, R. A.

### INTRODUCTION.

IT will interest readers of the following article to note that the special correspondent of the *Times*, writing from Camp Dir on May 6, 1895, says:

"At Gupis, sixty-five miles from Gilgit, where there is a small fort, built last year by the Government of India, as an advance post in the direction of Chitral, Lieutenant STEWART, R. A., was picked up (on Colonel KELLY's march) to take command of the two guns brought from Gilgit. This, as it proved, was a most valuable addition to the force, for Lieutenant STEWART is not only a highly scientific artilleryman and one who took the highest places in professional examinations, but also a man of unbounded energy and determination.

A. J. A.

On January 5, 1895, the first news reached Gilgit of the murder of the Mehtar, NIZAM-UL-MULK, of Chitral, by his brother, AMIR-UL-MULK. Lieutenant GURDON, Political officer, was then in Chitral with eight men of Fourteenth Sikhs. Fifty men Fourteenth Sikhs were at once ordered to join him from Mastuj under SOUBADAR GURMUKH SINGH. This they did forthwith. Mr. ROBERTSON, C. S. I., British Agent at Gilgit, arrived at Chitral on 31st January with forty rifles, Fourteenth Sikhs under Lieutenant HARLEY, and 100 rifles of Fourth Kashmir Imperial Infantry, with Captains CAMPBELL and TOWNSEND. One hundred men Fourth Kashmir Rifles followed on 2d February, and on 20th February Captain BAIRD reinforced Chitral with another 100 men of Fourth Kashmir Rifles. The garrison occupied the fort and numbered —

100 rifles Fourteenth Sikhs, under Lieutenant HARLEY.

300 rifles Fourth Kashmir Rifles, with Captains CAMPBELL, TOWNSHEND and BAIRD.

On March 3d, Chitral fort was surrendered, and all communication ceased with Gilgit. Lieutenant FOWLER, R. E., and EDWARDES, Indian Staff Corps, left Mastuj with some sixty men, with a convoy of ammunition to open up communications. They were surrounded in a house in Réshan, and fought desperately for seven days, having to make sorties for water; Lieutenant FOWLER was wounded. The enemy then told them peace had been arranged, sent them provisions, and two or three days later invited them to see a game of polo. The officers, probably fearing to jeopardize the only chance of escape of their party, accepted. On a signal from MAHOMED ISA, the leader of the Chitralis in Réshan, they were set on suddenly, taken prisoners with the escort they had brought, and bound. The house in which their party was, was rushed, and all sepoys not Mahomedans murdered in cold blood.

Early in March, Lieutenant MOBERLEY, D. S. O., Political officer at Mastuj, having heard some disquieting rumors, arranged for Captain Ross, with Lieutenant JONES and 100 rifles Fourteenth Sikhs, to leave Mastuj and reinforce Lieutenant FOWLER. He proceeded as far as Buni, some seventeen miles from Mastuj, left a party of forty men there, intending to make a dash to reach FOWLER and EDWARDES, and return with them. On the way he was set on in a defile by men rolling stones down the mountain sides from a height of 2,000 feet, lost many men, and tried to return. His retreat over the river was cut by the bridge being broken, and a long line of stone entrenchments (sangars), opened fire on them. The survivors reached some caves in the hills, and remained there two nights and days. An attempt was made to scale the mountains and turn out the enemy, but a precipice was reached and return became necessary, one man being killed by falling, in the attempt to scale the precipice. The only alternative now left was for the party to cut their way back at any cost. This was done, but only Lieutenant JONES and fourteen men, of whom ten were wounded, got through to Buni. Captain Ross was shot through the head, storming a sangar, after he had killed several of the enemy himself. Lieutenant JONES and his men rejoined their forty men in Buni, and resisted successfully till Lieutenant MOBERLEY relieved them six days later with 150 men from Mastuj. He escorted them, followed by enemy in large numbers to Mastuj, having done thirty-four miles over a mountain road without halting, his men carrying their kits and 120 rounds each. Mastuj was surrounded on March 22d, and all communications ceased with Gilgit and Chitral.

On March 22d, great alarm being felt in Gilgit at non-receipt of

any post from Chitral, a column was collected at Gilgit under command of Colonel KELLY, Thirty-third Pioneers, consisting of 400 rifles Thirty-second Pioneers under Captain BORRADAILE, and two guns No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery under Lieutenant STEWART, R. A. Colonel KELLY's orders were to advance towards Chitral, and if possible relieve it and Mastuj. We arrived at Ghizar, about 120 miles from Gilgit on 31st March. Here our difficulties began, there being a hitch as to transport, and Ghizar being at an elevation of 10,000 feet, snow was lying about eight inches deep. The road from Ghizar lies for thirteen miles along the Ghizar Valley, over more or less level ground to Langar, which is at the Gilgit side of the Shandour Pass. The road rises here gradually for some four miles to Shandour Lake, 12,500 feet, passes over the lake at this season of the year, and descends rapidly some five miles on to Lasper, a large village at the elevation of 10,000 feet.

On leaving Ghizar on 1st April the column proceeded for about five miles, when deep snow was encountered, so that the battery mules and transport ponies went in over their shoulders, and it was found impossible to proceed with them, even unloaded. The column returned; 200 pioneers with all cooly transport were left at Tera, a small village three miles from Ghizar, with orders to proceed when possible; the remainder returned to Ghizar. On 2d April heavy snow fell. Sledges and toboggans were made and tried for guns and ammunition in Ghizar, and appeared to answer fairly well. On 3d April the guns joined the pioneers at Tera, and proceeded as far as the mules could go, all battery men carrying their own kits. They were then placed on the sledges. It had now, however, become very hot; the track made was not broad enough for the sledges, and snow was soft. The labor of dragging was excessive, so the guns and ammunition were slung on poles and carried by gunners and sepoy. Owing to deep snow and the narrow track this was most arduous work, as when a man's foot got off the track he went in up to his waist. We proceeded at about half mile an hour till 8:30 P. M., when we were about three miles from Langar; here darkness came on, men could not see where to place their feet, and were utterly done. All loads were stacked in the snow, upright poles being left to mark the spot in case of more snow falling, which appeared likely. The last men got into camp at 11 P. M., and had to bivouac on the snow with a bitter wind and severe cold, no tents having been brought from Gilgit. The next day the 200 pioneers, under Captain BORRADAILE, crossed the pass to Laspur, which they reached with great difficulty at 7:30 P. M. The gunners and fifty

men of the Fourth Kashmir Rifles and thirty-eight coolies returned to fetch the guns and ammunition, which reached Langar by 4 P. M., and the men bivouacked again. At 6 A. M. on 5th April the guns started over the pass, forty relief coolies met us half way, and the guns arrived in Laspur at 4:30 P. M., nearly all the men being snow-blind and very done up. On 6th April a reconnaissance took place ten miles down Mastuj Valley and back, guns being carried by coolies. The enemy were discovered in position at Chakalwat. On 7th April troops halted to recruit, and Colonel KELLY joined us. On 8th April the force moved to Gusht, two miles from Chakalwat, and eight miles from Mastuj. The enemy were observed strengthening their sangars. They were attacked on 9th April, and driven out after an hour's fighting, losing some twenty or so killed. The column marched into Mastuj, which had been shut up for eighteen days, but was all correct.

Two hundred more pioneers joined here on 11th April, and the gun, carriage and wheel saddles having been got over the pass, the guns and ammunition were packed on country ponies, about thirteen hands high, which seemed to act fairly well. On 13th April the column, consisting now of 400 pioneers, two guns, 100 Fourth Kashmir Rifles, forty Kashmir sappers and miners and 150 levies, advanced to attack the enemy at Nisha Gol, a very strong position on the far side of a deep, precipitous nullah. The enemy had a line of sangars along the far edge of nullah right across the valley, with sangars at intervals up the steep mountains on either side into the snows, and occupied, as far as we could guess, by some 2,000 men. The nullah above mentioned bisected a large, undulating, fan-shaped delta, inclining up from the Chitral River to short, rugged nullah into the mountains on our right. The cliff over the river was sheer for 200 feet, and into the water course of the nullah for 250 to 300 feet.

The only way of crossing the nullah appeared by the road, which had been cut away on either side of the nullah, and was blocked on the far side by some large sangars, occupied by about 1,000 men. On the other side of the river precipices rose, which were quite impassable, and studded with many sangars.

The column having advanced by right bank of river, debouched into the plain and deployed to attack enemy's left. The guns came into action at 500 yards, the first point from which the lower sangar was visible. After this was silenced the guns advanced to within 150 yards of the large sangar, a most formidable one. This was necessary, owing to undulating ground, but it had luckily been



evacuated. The guns came into action at 275 yards on another sangar, and fired common shell into it, and just before retiring two rounds of case. This sangar also being silenced, the guns retired, and came into action at 1,050 yards, and 850 yards on large sangars on enemy's right. Levies were sent to turn enemy's left flank high up the nullah, the Thirty-second Pioneers keeping sangar fire down by well directed volleys. Light ladders with ropes were let down into the nullah, and men crossed slowly, there being a goat track up the far side. When the enemy saw that the levies had turned their flank, and sepoys were crossing the nullah, they retired from all their sangars and fled towards Chitral. Volleys were fired at them, and some rounds of shrapnel. The main body crossed by the road and bivouacked about one mile beyond the scene of action. Our losses were six killed and sixteen wounded, of which the guns lost three killed and three wounded. The enemy were seen carrying away their dead and wounded. We found some twenty dead, and computed their losses at fifty killed and 100 wounded; this was more or less confirmed by native intelligence.

The enemy were armed with many Martini and Snider rifles, and had lots of ammunition, and made wonderfully good shooting. Had not the ground been undulating, our losses must have been much greater.

The wounded were returned to Mastuj, and on 14th the column marched to Kila Drasan, a most arduous march. There had been a hitch in commissariat and transport arrangements beyond Ghizar, the people having fled. The roads and bridges were broken in many places on the road to Chitral, and we did not arrive till 20th. The enemy were not again met with, and evacuated Chitral on night of 18th to 19th. We arrived just in time, as the garrison said they did not think they could have held out another week.

Great credit was due to all ranks for the way they performed this most arduous march; carrying the guns was very hard work. There was only one case of falling out in the section; this was due to severe snow-blindness, and altogether there were thirty cases of snow-blindness and twenty-six of frost bite. We were all very pleased in Chitral to receive two congratulatory telegrams from Sir GEORGE WHITE, praising the resolution shown in getting over the snow and the conduct of the troops in action.

The following account of the siege of Chitral Fort is deduced from notes kindly lent by Captain CAMPBELL, Central India Horse:

Chitral Fort is a square erection, having a high square tower at each corner, made of stone, wood and mud. The walls are about

twenty feet, the towers from thirty feet to forty-five feet high. The fort lies near the river, that is, low down, and can be seen into and commanded from all sides. A covered way had been made to reach the river, there being no other water supply. Trees grew quite close up to the walls on three sides, and owing to suddenness of investment, there was no time to cut them down. Although a bad position, the fort was the only place offering a chance of resisting the large numbers of the enemy for any time. A large quantity of grain had been stored, and the men had 300 rounds per rifle.

On Sunday, 3d March, news was received that SHER AFZUL, with a numerous following, had arrived at the southern extremity of Chitral plain, about four miles from the fort. Captains CAMPBELL, TOWNSHEND and BAIRD proceeded to make a reconnaissance with 200 Kashmir sepoy. The enemy not showing up in great numbers at first, an attempt was made to dislodge them from a hamlet called Koka Sand. On becoming closely engaged, the enemy appeared in great numbers, and many were seen descending the high hills on our right, whither Captain BAIRD had been sent with some men.

An attempt was made to clear the village with the bayonet, but failed. Captain CAMPBELL was shot in the knee just prior to the rush; Captain BAIRD was mortally wounded almost at once; Captain TOWNSHEND led the rush on the village, and on either side of him were General BAJ SINGH and Major BIKHAN SINGH, of the Kashmir army. These were both shot dead. It appeared impossible to do anything but retire, so the men were placed behind a wall and waited for darkness. At 6:30 P. M. the order to retire by alternate half companies was given. The steadiness of the movement was interfered with by an overwhelming fire from front and flanks. Every bit of cover was made use of to check the enemy, and the troops reached the fort at 7:30 P. M., having lost twenty-two killed and thirty-four wounded. The final retirement was covered by fifty men of Fourteenth Sikhs. Surgeon-Captain WHITCHURCH, I. M. S., had proceeded at once, under a very hot fire, to assist Captain BAIRD. He carried him down the hill, and placed him in a dooly, but two of the bearers were at once shot, and WHITCHURCH, with one sepoy, and escorted by four others, carried BAIRD about half mile, till they reached a deep nullah running across the Chitral plain towards the river. They did this under a most severe fire, and three or four times were obliged to place BAIRD on the ground and with the bayonet clear the enemy from stone walls in their front. On reaching the nullah, they found it impossible to proceed straight, and had to make a long detour by the river, and under fire, arriving at the fort

with nearly every one of the party hit. Captain BAIRD was again hit quite close to the fort. Surgeon-Captain WHITCHURCH has been recommended for the Victoria Cross, for this very gallant deed, and the sepoy for the Order of Merit. From 3d March to 19th April the fort was closely invested on all sides by the enemy. They built fascine entrenchments at forty yards distance, and kept up a fire night and day. They were armed with many breech-loading rifles and lots of ammunition, and the losses in the fort amounted to seventeen killed and thirty wounded. The conduct of the Fourteenth Sikhs, under Lieutenant HARLEY, was beyond praise. They never got a night off the walls, and the greater the danger became the more cheerful they appeared. The garrison was rationed from 3d March on one pound of gritty flour only daily, and the only meat obtainable was the officers' ponies. Several attempts were made to fire the fort, one of which fired a tower largely made of wood, and in attempting to put this out, the British Agent, Mr. ROBERTSON, was severely wounded in left shoulder.

The enemy also mined to within two yards of one tower, and when this was discovered, on 18th April, Lieutenant HARLEY, with forty Sikhs and sixty Kashmir sepoy, made a brilliant sortie, caught the enemy in the mine, killed forty-six of them, and blew in the mine. His party lost eight killed and fourteen wounded.

Great preparations had been made for a grand assault on 19th April, but the enemy fled on the approach of the Gilgit column on the night of the 18th to 19th. The whole garrison were never off the walls at night, and endured their privations cheerfully. The bhisties should not be forgotten; two of them were killed and one wounded.

## PROFESSIONAL NOTES.

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### HOW THE FIRST MAINE HEAVY ARTILLERY LOST 1,179 MEN IN THIRTY DAYS.

The organization of heavy artillery constituted a peculiar and distinct branch of service in the late war. Practically speaking, during the first three years of the war, they were neither artillery nor infantry, though allied to both. Their uniform was of the infantry pattern though trimmed with the red of the artillery, and though they were well drilled in the tactics of all the heavy guns from the six-inch mortar to the hundred-pounder Parrott, yet they were fully armed and equipped as infantry, and could show a better line and execute all the intricate movements of that branch of service with more precision than any infantry regiment in the field.

This was their standing, when to the number of 25,000, in the month of May, 1864, this force was ordered from the defences of Washington to join the forces of General GRANT near Spottsylvania Court House. From this time until the surrender of General LEE at Appomattox, they were to all intents and purposes so many regiments of infantry, working in the same brigades, making the same marches, enduring the same hardships and fighting the same battles with the infantry regiments, and, in short, after being incorporated into the infantry brigades their only distinction was the red trimming upon their uniforms and the cross cannons upon their caps. As a general thing these regiments had been recruited and organized as infantry, then by special orders from the War Department they were transferred to the heavy artillery branch of the service and recruited up to 1,800 men by filling the ten old companies to 150 men each and by adding two new companies of equal numbers.

When the First Maine Heavy Artillery marched down Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, on the morning of May 15, 1864, it was a regiment of nominally 1,800 men, but of course all were not present for duty. Some had permanent details away from the command, others were scattered in the Northern hospitals, while a large contingent, including the large number of sick in our post hospital and many others who had been on duty about camp, but were unable to bear the fatigues of the march, were left behind. Besides

this, quite a number were detailed as cooks, orderlies, and hostlers. The exact number of men which the regiment took into battle the 19th of May, I have been unable to determine, but the knowledge I have of my own company and the written statements of several company commanders, noted down at the time, and from all the information I can gather, I am satisfied that not over 1,600 were with us that day.

The regiment embarked on a transport at the foot of Seventh Street during the forenoon of May 15th, and landed at Belle Plain the same evening, where it remained until the morning of the 17th, when it took up the line of march, passed through Fredericksburg and arrived at Spottsylvania at 11 o'clock that evening. We had now literally arrived at the seat of war and were liable to be called into action at any time. Made up from good material, perhaps no better, and certainly no worse than the average regiment from the old Pine Tree State, the schooling we had received while in the defences of Washington had made us thorough soldiers so far as drill and discipline were concerned, but we lacked the practical knowledge of fighting the enemy or how best to protect ourselves when in range of the enemy's bullets. This we learned later on in the hard school of experience, that is, what few of us there were left after thirty days of such schooling. Early on the morning of the 18th, we were awakened by the booming of cannon. We had heard the artillery firing at the second Bull Run battle in 1862, and at Aldie in 1863, and in each case were at a safe distance, with no likelihood of being called into action, but now the case was different. The firing was only a mile or two away, and in less than ten minutes we were moving on double quick time towards the point of attack, going into line behind well built breastworks in support of what proved a feeble attack by our forces on the bloody angle, the scene of General HANCOCK's brilliant charge on the morning of the 12th. Here we prepared breakfast, accustomed ourselves to our new surroundings, and enjoyed as best we could our first day under fire. We were well out of the range of bullets, but many shells burst along the line, yet we moved out late in the afternoon with ranks unbroken, and at roll call the next morning, for the last time, every comrade answered, "Here."

All day the 19th, the troops from the right of our army were moving away to the left, and the Fredericksburg Pike, over which our supply trains were moving, became uncovered, and the enemy, always feeling for an opportunity, had advanced a force under General EWELL, which had cautiously moved along, until late in the afternoon they struck the wagon train protected only by a light guard, which was immediately swept away, and our supplies were in their hands. Our regiment chanced to be the nearest the point of attack, and it was started at once on the double quick. About the time we started a heavy shower came on, but on we rushed through rain and mud, and as we neared the train filed off to the right so as to bring ourselves into line, then made a dash for the wagons. The force of the enemy at that point was not a heavy one, and they

were brushed away without a halt on our part, some being captured; but the larger part fell back to their main line. Advancing for half a mile through the thicket without meeting the enemy we emerged into a clearing, a field of perhaps ten acres, divided nearly equally by a small sluggish brook fringed by low trees and running from right to left. The ground sloped gently on our side of the brook, but was steeper beyond up to the edge of the woods, where the enemy were posted. Up this hill the force driven from the wagon train were rushing as we came out of the woods, but were soon out of sight.

The regiment moved two-thirds the way down the slope, where they were brought to a halt, and firing commenced which lasted two hours and twenty minutes. During all this time the men stood, fought just as you see them in pictures, and were the coolest lot of men I ever saw under any circumstances. They loaded, took aim and fired, then would deliberately clear the smoke from their guns by half cocking, throwing off the old cap and blowing into the muzzle, always giving the gun time to cool a little before reloading. Men were falling, to be sure, but those who were able got away to the rear, while those who were not, lay quietly along the line, and the survivors were too much engaged with their work to notice much about them until the enemy retired and the firing ceased. I spoke of our being in an open field; so we were, but not all. We made so long a line that one or two companies on either flank extended into the woods and were more or less protected; in fact, the loss in Company "D" amounted only to one killed, and he on the color guard out in the field, and three slightly wounded; while on the other hand, Company "E," which was in the field and fully exposed, had twenty-three killed or mortally wounded and forty-seven others wounded—a total of seventy out of 135 who went into action. The loss in the regiment was 155 killed or mortally wounded and 369 wounded—a total of 524. This was an enormous loss, amounting to nearly one-third of the number engaged.

In fact, up to this time since the war began, no regiment had suffered such a numerical loss in any one battle, but the end was not yet. There were two things which largely contributed to our loss. The first and most important was the position in which we were halted on the field. Had we remained at the edge of the woods on the hill, or even advanced across the brook, we should have been partially covered from the enemy's fire. Then, had we thrown ourselves flat on the ground, a less number of men would have been hit. After this the regiment never fought the enemy while standing, except in making an advance. As soon as the firing slackened, Company "E," of which I was a member, was deployed as skirmishers, and advanced against the enemy so close that two of our men in the woods on the left of the company were taken prisoners, one of whom went to Andersonville, but the other not liking to take the chances of prison life, tried his hand at making his escape. He was a wily fellow, fertile in resources, and as cool as he was brave. He not only succeeded in making his escape back to our lines, but brought in a

prisoner with him. It was not all smooth sailing for him, for he was obliged to shoot down two of the enemy who stood in the way of his escape. Near midnight the company was relieved and ordered in to a point on the hill in rear of where we had fought in the afternoon. The men came in through the darkness, singly or by twos, and I venture the assertion that no more cordial greetings were ever accorded than were extended to each new comer by those who had preceded him. We had been in service twenty-one months and had learned to trust and love each other as brothers, and is it any wonder that tears came unbidden—tears of sorrow that so many had fallen, and of joy that so many had escaped?

Later on I accompanied a squad of men who were going on to the field to bring off the body of Lieutenant JOHN F. KNOWLES, of our company, who had been killed. As we neared the point where we had stood in line, I noticed eight or ten of our men laid out side by side, the beams of the moon struggling through the fleecy clouds, lighting their upturned faces, all smeared with the smoke of battle, some showing gaping wounds, and all ghastly and lifeless. Looking to the right, where the color guard and Company "M" had stood, was a similar lot of dead carefully laid out; beyond this another and another, until the woods were reached, and the same thing away to the left. It was a solemn moment, as I gazed on the scene at that midnight hour, my first look upon a deserted battlefield, and how forcibly those rows of dead men reminded me of the gavels of reaped grain among which I had worked on my native hills, but here the reaper was the Angel of Death. I picked up a canteen to replace my own which had been pierced by two bullets, and hurried from the field. One look was enough.

ERVIN CHAMBERLAIN went into action on my left. This was his only battle, and the impressions made on his mind were lasting. He told me a few weeks ago that the man on my right and the one on his left, as well as the two who covered us in the rear rank, were all killed or mortally wounded, and that he was hit seven times before being disabled, and I could count the marks of nine bullets which had made a close call on me. At 11 o'clock the night of the 20th, the regiment was on the march, which was kept up at a rapid pace for seventeen hours, with less than five minutes' rest during the time. Passing through Bowling Green, we were halted near Milford Station, where the regiment went into line and threw up breastworks, while Company "D," under Lieutenant HENRY E. SELLERS, was advanced as a line of pickets, but were attacked by the enemy, losing one man killed, one wounded, and one prisoner.

On the 23d of May we reached a point near the North Anna River, and near night were subjected to a severe shell fire, losing two or three men. We were kept in reserve until the afternoon of the 24th, when we crossed over the river on a bridge upon the run, under one of the liveliest shell fires we ever got into. Probably twenty-five shells exploded over our heads while making the run, but one man only was hit, getting a slight scalp wound by a small sliver of iron. We labored most of the night building breastworks



and remained here until the night of the 26th, when the army was withdrawn to the north side of the river, and proceeded on another flank movement. The loss of the regiment was two killed or mortally wounded and five wounded. The 28th and 29th we were near Hanovertown, where we had one man killed. The 30th we moved out near Totopotomy Creek, and the morning of the 31st moved across the creek and assisted in driving the enemy from their outer line of works. Getting into position, we lay under a broiling sun and a most uncomfortable shell fire the rest of the day. In this action we had three men killed and ten wounded, mostly by exploding shells. One shell exploded immediately over the left of Company "K," which lay on the right of Company "E." One "K" man was killed and two others wounded, but the "E" men were all unhurt, though several pieces of the iron struck among us, one piece going through the gun-stock of Corporal FENLASON and another demolishing Sergeant CHAPIN's canteen. In a few minutes some enterprising man in the company, who was short of cooking tools, had melted the solder around the edge of the canteen, and with a split stick for a handle on the good half, was busy frying meat and preparing his supper.

The next day, June 1st, commenced the battle, or rather, series of battles, of Cold Harbor. In this action our regiment was not directly engaged with the enemy, but were held in reserve while other regiments and brigades were being hurled under a terrible fire against a line of earthworks so strong and well protected by abatis and almost impenetrable slashes that no force of men, however brave, could hope to break, so long as the works were well manned. Our work was to rush from point to point along the line, now to the right, then to the left, in quick succession, always exposed more or less to the scattering fire from the not far away front. The heavy fighting was on the 1st and 3d of June, and the loss to the army amounted to some 13,000 men. Our regiment was continually under the scattering fire of the enemy, and scarcely a day passed from the 1st to the 12th of June but what one or more of our men were wounded. A reconnaissance of Company "A," on the evening of the 12th, resulted in the loss of five prisoners. The total loss of the regiment in those twelve days amounted to one killed, twenty-seven wounded, and seven prisoners. At 10:30 on the night of June 12th we moved out of the works, marched a few miles, then slept by the roadside the rest of the night. The 13th we crossed the Chickahominy and marched to the James River, which we crossed on transports on the 14th, and 11 o'clock on the night of the 15th found us facing the enemy's lines in front of Petersburg. Late in the afternoon of the 16th we were advanced against the works in our front, being in the second line, and not directly engaged, but lost some men. Working all night, throwing up breastworks, we were given a day of comparative rest through the 17th, but were kept well up to the front, losing occasionally a man. That evening we were put into the front line on the right of the Prince George Court House Road, where we soon became engaged with the enemy. A brisk fire was kept up for some twenty minutes, in which Major

GEORGE W. SABINE was struck by a minié ball, which passed through one thigh and lodged in the other, from the effects of which he died the following May. At 4 o'clock on the morning of the 18th we emerged from this position, driving in the enemy's pickets, and developing the fact that they had withdrawn from their position of the night before to an inner and stronger line. Taking position along the road in front of the HARE field and buildings, we soon had a strong line of earthworks, which we felt capable of defending in case of an attack. Several attempts had been made by the different corps to break through the enemy's line at various points in the course of the day, but without success, when well along in the afternoon General BIRNEY, then in command of the Second Corps, received from General MEADE the following orders:

"I have sent positive orders to Generals BURNSIDE and WARREN to attack at all hazards with their whole force. I find it useless to appoint an hour to effect coöperation, and am therefore compelled to give you the same order. You have a large corps, powerful and numerous, and I beg that you will at once, as soon as possible, assault in strong column. The day is fast going, and I wish the practicability of carrying the enemy's line settled before dark."

MOTT's division was selected as the assaulting column, and when the order was transmitted to him he protested vigorously against so rash and hopeless an undertaking, but protests under such circumstances avail nothing. The order was positive, and must be obeyed. Our Third Brigade was designated to make the direct assault, and the other brigades were well in hand to follow up any advantage that we might possibly gain. The different regiments composing the brigade were withdrawn from the line and brought together a little to the rear under cover of the woods, and then marched back into position in column in an open pine growth back from the road, so we should just clear the HARE house on the right as we advanced. As we came into position we found that our regiment not only headed the column, but we had been made a column by ourselves by breaking up into three battalions of four companies each, and according to our instructions, the first battalion was to lead off, and each succeeding battalion to follow at a distance of twenty paces. In short, the First Maine Heavy Artillery became the "strong column" with which the assault was made, for no other regiment advanced beyond the road. It was just as well, for no ten thousand men in column could have pierced that line, manned as it was with infantry and artillery. The more to advance the more to be killed; that was all. There was lead and canister enough, and to spare. From our position among the pines we could see the whole field over which we must pass and the earthworks beyond. We could see the men behind those works, no doubt elated at the prospect of the harvest of death they were about to reap; but the two batteries which were to be served with double-shotted canister on either flank were under cover. It was perfectly safe to stand up now, both for Union and Confederate troops, for on our part of the line, at least, the noise of the battle was hushed; it was the lull before the storm.

And now came the final preliminaries before starting. We were ordered to load, and the guns were loaded and capped; then to fix bayonets, which was done. Instructions were given not to fire a shot until we got into the enemy's works. "Pile up your knapsacks, and leave two men from each company to guard them," ordered the Colonel. The guards were detailed, and the men stripped to light marching order. For the next few minutes the guards were busy with pencil and note book taking down addresses of wife, mother, sister or loved one far away in Maine. When called to attention, the men were readily in place. There was a little nervous tightening of belts, and a little firmer grasp of the musket as it was brought to a trail. Teeth may have been set a little harder to prevent any sign of trembling which might take possession of us. The order was given, and we dashed off at double-quick time. A shower of lead struck us, but the men involuntarily pulled their cap visors down over their eyes, and with bowed heads advanced against the storm. The shells crashed over our heads for a minute, and then the deadly canister got in its work. The ranks melted and the lines grew thin, but on we pressed, hoping against hope, a few getting nearly up to the abatis, when the order to retreat was given, and such as could got off the field.

Thus ended the battle of Petersburg, and "the practicability of carrying the enemy's line" was settled in the negative. I wish to say a word here in regard to the time we were on the field. I have seen it estimated by those present all the way from eight to twenty minutes. Let us figure a little. The distance from the point of starting to the enemy's line is 350 yards. Now, 352 yards is one-fifth of a mile, so the distance out and back is two-fifths of a mile, over which a man can easily walk in eight minutes, going at the rate of a mile in twenty minutes. The average speed we attained in the advance and retreat must have shortened the time one-half from that of a walk, so that it is altogether probable that in four minutes after starting every man except those disabled was off the field. Our loss in this battle counted up 240 killed and died of wounds, and 364 wounded; a total of 604, nearly all of which occurred in the assault of the 18th of June.

The Eighth New York Heavy Artillery had suffered a loss at Cold Harbor which exceeded ours at Spottsylvania, but our loss at Petersburg stands out as being the heaviest that occurred in any regiment in any one battle during the whole war, while that at Spottsylvania stands third in the list, being exceeded only by the loss of the Eighth New York above mentioned. Our losses from May 19th to June 18th, a period of thirty days, had been:

	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
Spottsylvania.....	155	369	524
Milford Station.....	1	1	2
North Anna.....	2	5	7
Hanover Town.....	1	.....	1
Totopotomy.....	3	10	13
Cold Harbor.....	1	27	28
Petersburg.....	240	364	604
Total.....	403	776	1,179

Besides this we had lost fourteen prisoners, twelve of whom died in Southern prisons. To the casual reader the results to the regiment of this thirty days of fighting represents the death of 415 men, and 776 others more or less disabled for life, but to us of the command and to our families it means more. It means not only death, but individual suffering. Comparatively few of the killed die instantly, and those who linger from a few hours to many months have their cup of suffering filled to the brim.

And what of the loved ones at home? It means sorrow without measure; it means an aged father or mother going down in poverty and grief to the grave for the want of a staff to lean upon; it means a widowed wife and orphan children; it means other than literal wounds, which are never healed on earth. The same thing holds true, though in a less degree, in all the ordinary losses in battle, but this aggregation of death, of suffering and of anguish, becomes terrible to contemplate on account of its magnitude. Considering the number of men engaged, and the brief time in which this loss occurred, it is without a parallel in the history of modern warfare. —*Major Charles J. House, in The Maine Bugle.*

#### PURCHASING CAVALRY HORSES.

Captain ALESHIRE, Assistant Quartermaster, the officer detailed to inspect cavalry horses in St. Louis under recent contracts, has adopted the very sensible plan of accompanying the buyers through the horse raising districts, with a view to selecting the best mounts obtainable for cavalry. This saves the contractor from shipping a great many unsuitable horses to St. Louis, only to be rejected upon arrival. Some of these horses bought in the immediate vicinity of Fort Leavenworth have been turned over to the squadron of the Sixth Cavalry, without being shipped on the cars, or stabled in city stables, thus avoiding the probability of contracting influenza.

Another innovation, which it is hoped will be so successful as to encourage its extension, is to furnish the names of the sires of these horses in order to have the remounts carefully watched, to determine what colts develop into the best cavalry horses. This is with a view to encourage the breeding of mares to those stallions most likely to produce colts suitable for army use. The farmers in

the neighborhood are willing and anxious to raise such horses as are adapted to cavalry service, and if this small beginning is followed out to a legitimate and successful conclusion, the question of remount farms and other projects may be happily solved in a most natural and business-like way, without causing the government to go to the expense of providing establishments for breeding and raising horses on its own account.

The one serious drawback to the success of this excellent plan is, that while farmers may breed according to the recommendations made after trial of various colts, and produce just what is wanted, the evils of the contract system crop out, for the lowest bidder may refuse to buy his horses in that part of the country at all. It is believed that if farmers are willing to devote special attention to the production of cavalry remounts, contractors would find it advantageous to buy from them. A failure to respond to the exigencies of the case should be cause sufficient to ask Congress to authorize the Secretary of War to announce a fixed price each year for certain localities, and let all the farmers compete. This would educate horse raisers very quickly, for it is manifestly to their interests to raise only what they can sell to advantage.

In any event the experiment now being tried saves the transportation of the horses to St. Louis and back, and leaves them for duty within a few miles of where raised so that they do not have to be acclimated, a process which often takes a year, and sometimes is never accomplished.

W. H. C.

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### HORSES AND BICYCLES.

The craze for bicycle riding has assumed such proportions that many otherwise conservative people think they are about to witness the complete downfall of that staunch and loyal friend of the human race, the horse. Such views are inconsistent with the teachings of history, and careful thought as to the limitations of the case should be sufficient to explode any theories of that kind. The possibilities of the application of steam may have worried the past generation of horse breeders, but there can be no doubt that railroads and steam vessels have materially aided the horse breeding interests of the world by the rapid extension of settlement and consequent increased agricultural developments.

That the raising of common Eastern stock and Western broncos, classed in the markets as "scrubs," is no longer profitable, is not altogether a matter for public regret. The best papers in the country devoted to agricultural interests as well as all government publications have for many years set forth the disadvantages of breeding worthless animals, but nothing could be written in the way of argument half as effective as the recent decline in prices, and finally the total disappearance of any market for this product.

The prices of horses have fallen in common with everything else during the past two years, and the large numbers of such animals

between the ages of one and five years in the hands of farmers has been a source of serious consideration to them because of the uncertain conditions of the near future. In some sections the breeding of mares has been curtailed, while in many instances jacks are being used to breed mules for the great cotton section. This refers to ordinary farm horses, for the depression has not prevented the breeding of high class animals in any way whatever.

The establishment of annual horse shows has shown so many advantages over the ordinary country fairs, that breeders of first-class animals are encouraged to exhibit the very best produced, and purchasers are always at hand for prize animals of almost every class.

Now that the seal of fashion has been put upon bicycling the world seems about to revolutionize the methods of exercise and transportation in order to avoid the use of horses. One of the cheap arguments is, that bicycles do not require grooming and feeding. In all fairness it might be replied that horsemen do not have to carry monkey wrenches, bolts, lanterns, etc. But this sort of argument is puerile. The true lover of the horse finds more pleasure and entertainment in the possession of a fine animal than could possibly come to him through the ownership of the most perfect "wheel." This is aside from the actual riding or driving of the animal, and it is safe to predict that those who are really fond of horses and amply able to bear the expense of ownership, will not surrender the pleasures of a visit to the stable, a gallop across the country or a friendly "brush" on the road, however much they may be carried away temporarily with the craze.

So far as the army is concerned the advent of bicycle corps comes only as an addition, and in nowise supplants any of the components of a well regulated force. No bicycle corps can do away with animals for transport service, and as for cavalry, now more than ever before the eyes and ears of the army, its composition and duties and the necessity of its being are not affected in any way whatever. So far as any injury to the sale of cavalry horses, there has been none. It is a regrettable fact that the contractors for the supply of cavalry horses are not able to procure suitable animals to fill their contracts within any reasonable space of country in the United States. The class of horses demanded for this service is not raised in perfection on many farms, and even in the great horse State of Missouri the government is buying in open market at this time, because the contractors have failed to find the number of horses required for remounts this summer, a season of almost profound peace.

The possibilities of the bicycle in some directions are scarcely comprehended even by enthusiasts. If the records are absolutely accurate, then the bicyclists have made faster time than horses running, pacing or trotting:

	1-4 Mile.	1-2 Mile.	3-4 Mile.	1 Mile.
Johnson (bicyclist) .....	.21 $\frac{1}{2}$	.46 $\frac{1}{2}$	1.11 $\frac{1}{2}$	1.35 $\frac{1}{2}$
Salvator (race horse) .....	.23 $\frac{1}{2}$	.47 $\frac{1}{2}$	1.11 $\frac{1}{2}$	1.35 $\frac{1}{2}$
Flying Jib (pacer) .....	.29 $\frac{1}{2}$	.59	1.28 $\frac{1}{2}$	1.58 $\frac{1}{2}$
Robert J. (pacer) .....	.30 $\frac{1}{2}$	1.00 $\frac{1}{2}$	1.30 $\frac{1}{2}$	2.01 $\frac{1}{2}$
Alix (trotter) .....	.30 $\frac{1}{2}$	1.01 $\frac{1}{2}$	1.32 $\frac{1}{2}$	2.03 $\frac{1}{2}$

When it comes to long distance rides, some of the bicycle performances are marvelous. One, HOLBEIN, on July 7th, covered 297 miles in twenty-four hours, on roads between London and Peterborough. In a twenty-four hour track race at Putney, England, June 22d and 23d, A. C. FONTAINE made 474 miles 1296 yards in twenty-four hours. Only a few weeks ago, a Frenchman named HURST covered 515 miles on a track in twenty-four hours. These are certainly remarkable performances, but they do not exercise any influence as to the permanent popularity of the bicycle with the public at large.

Physicians will probably discover a train of minor evils arising from the new form of exercise, but if used in moderation there can be no doubt that bicycle riding will benefit more than it injures. There are many people who can indulge in the ownership of a bicycle to whom horseback riding is an unknown quantity. To these people are given the opportunity to go out over country roads and byways, thus opening up to them new scenes and incidents hitherto existing only in imagination. The manner of riding for such health and pleasure seekers as these should not correspond to the hump-backed record-breakers any more than a gentleman or lady on horseback should appear like an anxious jockey on a thoroughbred.

There is no antagonism between horses and bicycles so long as they do not actually interfere with one another on the road, but the increasing number of bicyclists is apt to make them pugnacious and their demands for right of way excessive, and this horsemen will resent, for roads are kept up at public expense, primarily for public convenience as to transportation. However, horsemen may content themselves in peace, for if history does not belie its teachings, the fashion will go out, and there will be thousands of second-hand bicycles offered for sale within a few years.

Then again, suppose half a million bicycles are in actual use in this country, and that each one supplanted a horse, which of course is not a fact, this would affect less than five per cent. of the total number of horses reported in the United States.

Electricity and cables have displaced the horse generally from street car traffic, and while the farmer is perhaps entitled to some sympathy, the patrons of street cars are to be congratulated on the change, and doubtless if the horse could express his views he would be found arrayed against a return to horse cars.

The cheap buggies and wagons of the present day have a ten-



deney to extend the use of horses; a drop in the price of horses will, if at all permanent cause thousands of vehicles to come into use as soon as the business revival is assured.

W. H. C.

### STATIONS OF BRITISH CAVALRY REGIMENTS.

First Life Guards.....	Lieut.-Col. Sir M. S. LOCKHART, Bt....	Hyde Park.
Second Life Guards.....	Lieut.-Col. EARL OF DUNDONALD.....	Windsor.
Royal Horse Guards.....	Lieut.-Col. J. F. BROCKLEHURST.....	Hyde Park.
First Dragoon Guards.....	Lieut.-Col. R. C. B. LAWRENCE.....	Norwich.
Second Dragoon Guards.....	Lieut.-Col. C. E. BECKET.....	Egypt.
Third Dragoon Guards.....	Lieut.-Col. R. K. PARKE.....	Natal.
Fourth Dragoon Guards.....	Lieut.-Col. P. K. DOYNE.....	Rawul Pindi.
Fifth Dragoon Guards.....	Lieut.-Col. M. BOWERS.....	Meerut.
Sixth Dragoon Guards.....	Lieut.-Col. T. C. PORTER.....	York.
Seventh Dragoon Guards.....	Lieut.-Col. W. CREAGH.....	Shorncliffe.
First Dragoons.....	Lieut.-Col. H. TOMKINSON.....	Dublin.
Second Dragoons.....	Lieut.-Col. A. C. E. WELBY.....	Aldershot.
Third Hussars.....	Lieut.-Col. C. W. H. HELYAR.....	Aldershot.
Fourth Hussars.....	Colonel J. B. P. BRABAZON.....	Aldershot.
Fifth Lancers.....	J. J. S. CHISHOLME.....	Muttra.
Sixth Dragoons.....	Lieut.-Col. A. C. MCKEAN, C.M.G.....	Manchester.
Seventh Hussars.....	Lieut.-Col. H. PAGET.....	Mhow.
Eighth Hussars.....	Lieut.-Col. J. DAVIDSON.....	Hounslow.
Ninth Lancers.....	Lt.-Col. J. A. STEWART-MACKENZIE.....	Aldershot.
Tenth Hussars.....	Lieut.-Col. N. C. WOOD.....	Newbridge.
Eleventh Hussars.....	Lieut.-Col. C. E. SWAINE.....	Sialkote.
Twelfth Lancers.....	Lieut.-Col. C. E. BECK.....	Edinburgh.
Thirteenth Hussars.....	Lieut.-Col. E. R. H. TORIN.....	Dundalk.
Fourteenth Hussars.....	Col. Hon. G. H. GOUGH.....	Cahir.
Fifteenth Hussars.....	Lieut.-Col. J. B. S. BULLEN.....	Dublin.
Sixteenth Lancers.....	Lieut.-Col. J. M. BABINGTON.....	Lucknow.
Seventeenth Lancers.....	Lieut.-Col. E. A. BELFORD.....	Preston.
Eighteenth Hussars.....	Lieut.-Col. E. A. PALEY.....	Umballa.
Nineteenth Hussars.....	Lieut.-Col. J. C. HANFORD.....	Bangalore.
Twentieth Hussars.....	Lieut.-Col. Lord BEAUMONT.....	Colchester.
Twenty-first Hussars.....	Lieut.-Col. R. H. MARTIN.....	Secunderabad.

### PROMOTION FROM THE RANKS IN THE BRITISH ARMY.

It may be true in theory that every private soldier is a possible commissioned officer, but the theory works out badly in practical application. During the past ten years only about two hundred have risen from the ranks. And it appears that no enquiry is made into the social status of a candidate for a commission beyond the fact that a C. O. is bound to satisfy himself that the candidate is in all respects qualified for the position of a commissioned officer. So far so good. But youngsters who have unfortunately failed to pass the examination for Sandhurst are anxious to know what regiment they can join as rankers in which they can look forward to a commission within a reasonable period.

The choice evidently lies between cavalry and infantry, as engineers and artillery are out of the question. Cavalry is undoubtedly the favorite with the "gentleman ranker." The handsome uniform,

the essential swagger of the horse soldier, and the attractions of riding over walking, are sufficient to account for the preference. Then a superior class of men enlist in the cavalry; they are better cared for in barracks, and the whole life has a higher tone than is obtainable in the ordinary infantry regiment. These are indubitable advantages, but against them must be placed the fact that so many "gentlemen rankers" are to be found in the cavalry, and that only the very pick and flower of them can hope to struggle through a commission. In certain crack cavalry corps a very large proportion of the troopers are so termed "army failures." One must admire the pluck and perseverance of these young fellows, who have made up their minds to obtain a commission from the ranks, but their chances of success are very slight.

With regard to the infantry, there are certain well-known corps bearing historic names whose deeds are in everybody's mouth, and who carry with them an atmosphere of smartness and dash. To serve in the ranks of one of these battalions is in itself a distinction. But this in itself will not help the "gentleman ranker" to a commission. All these crack line regiments have the same drawbacks as the cavalry corps. They are crowded with superior privates hoping for a rise to a commission. It is a difficult matter to get made even a sergeant in one of these sober, steady regiments, so many irreproachable candidates are there for that position. It seems, then, that the only way to obtain rapid promotion from the ranks is to enlist in an infantry regiment with a cloudy reputation as regards discipline and general behavior. If the N.C.O.'s are constantly getting into trouble for drunkenness and dilatoriness, it naturally follows that a well educated young fellow of steady habits would soon be made a sergeant, and once a sergeant it would depend on himself to push on rapidly, and to make a name for himself.—*Admiralty and Horse Guards Gazette.*

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#### MOUNTED ORDERLIES.

"Much interest has been aroused abroad by the demand lately made in the German Parliament for credits to cover the formation of a corps of mounted orderlies. The necessity for such an organization was thus officially brought forward by Major WACHS: 'The transmission of messages has become difficult owing to the introduction of smokeless powder, and is yet more important now than of old. Mounted orderlies are a necessity for use with the infantry, but cavalrymen could scarcely be trained for the work, nor could they be spared in the numbers required.' The Minister for War states that 'the German cavalry has no extra establishment of men and horses available for use with the infantry as mounted orderlies. Not a horse or man can now be spared from the cavalry. Long range weapons give a new feature to the battles of the future. The voice, which is the usual means for transmission of orders and messages, is no longer able to carry them to their widely extended destination.

The only effectual means of transmission now is the employment of mounted orderlies. This is no mere fad, it is the conclusion arrived at after the experiences of active service.' The result of these representations was a general order authorizing the formation of a detachment of mounted orderlies to be attached to the Guards Corps, and to the First and Fifteenth Army Corps. The corps of mounted orderlies, it is laid down, is intended to supply for the use of the general staff and of infantry divisions men who have been fully trained in the transmission of orders and information, and in all the duties of outposts and reconnaissance. 'They need not,' it is said, 'take altogether the place of cavalry attached to a division for reconnoitering and screening duties. But they will relieve the cavalry from such duties as escorts to generals and staff officers, to baggage, etc., and as mounted orderlies.' The establishment of each detachment, of which there are to be three, comprises one captain in command, one lieutenant, two second lieutenants, two sergeant-majors, four sergeants, six corporals, ninety-six men, and 108 horses. Each detachment will be attached for discipline and instruction to a cavalry regiment in its district. When a detachment is broken up for duty with different staffs, its officers will be available for employment in their army corps as orderly officers. They will thus be able to superintend generally the working of their men. The non-commissioned officers will be obtained by transfers or reëngagements from other regiments. The men will be enlisted for three years' service, and should possess these qualifications: knowledge of horses and their management, special aptitude for the work of mounted orderly, good conduct, good eyesight, ability to read and write German fluently. The armament consists of a sword and a revolver, the equipment includes field glasses and a map case.

As regards instruction, the objects to be aimed at are: Each orderly should be absolute master of his horse, he must know how to treat him generally, and especially in case of minor ailments and injuries; he must be a bold and clever horseman over all kinds of country; he must be able to find his way with or without a map, to observe rapidly and completely, and to report what he has seen clearly and in a few words. The three main points of the instructions are: (1) development of the riding powers of the man; (2) thorough training of the horse; (3) practical and theoretical instructions in the duties of mounted orderly. Individual training only is desired, not that of men in the ranks. The men are to be practiced in riding alone over all kinds of ground. They are not to be taught any movements or formations in bodies larger than mere column of route, such as half sections and sections; no instruction need be given in the use of the lance. The basis of the theoretical instruction rests on what will be required of the men on service. The points in particular insisted on are: reports, both written and verbal; map reading; principles of reconnaissance of villages, bridges, roads, fords, etc.; computation of the strength of troops of all arms; use of field glasses; estimation of distances; knowledge of staff and other uniforms and badges of rank; care of horses, shoeing, etc.

Every man should be able to render 'first aid' to his horse in the event of colic, rubs, overreaches, etc. The veterinary surgeon of the regiment to which the detachment is attached will be responsible for this part of the man's instruction. Practical work is to be carried out in individual expeditions, long rides, attendance at infantry maneuvers, etc. These orderlies are to be distributed among staffs and infantry divisions. The permanent attaching of orderlies takes place at the commencement of general maneuvers. For an approximate guide to their distribution it is proposed that the staff of an army corps should command the service of four orderlies, staff of a division five, staff of a brigade four, regiment of infantry eight, battalion of chasseurs two. In these numbers non-commissioned officers are included, except the two sergeant-majors, who with ten or twelve men and young horses remain at the depot.

"Under the head of employment care has to be taken that the orderlies, while performing all the duties that are expected of them, are not prematurely played out with boundless orders, nor used for services other than those for which they are intended. The orderlies, it is stipulated, are if possible to take part in all maneuvers and practical field exercises of any importance. The chief employment will be to keep up communication during an action between the staffs, their own troops, and the neighboring troops; to ensure a simultaneous receipt of an order by commanders of units. Of course, at a short distance from the enemy these orderlies would not be sent up to the first line. It is further pointed out that they should be trained to reconnoiter roads, crossing places, etc., to take the place of cyclists when the nature of the ground does not admit of their use.

"In forming a corps on the above principles the German army is once again showing to others a practical step in the development of efficiency. The move is naturally much commended in Germany and in France alike, especially in articles in the *Neue Militärische Blätter* and in the *Revue de Cavalerie*. The work of divisional cavalry on service should be as interesting and as redundant in gallant deeds as that of the cavalry divisions; indeed, its opportunities of coming into action should, from the nature of its employment and surroundings, be more frequent. But experience in the Franco-German War showed that, on the contrary, the divisional cavalry was seldom able to gather laurels for itself owing to the manner in which it was misemployed. Briefly, the duties of divisional cavalry are to carry out the reconnoitering and screening duties for the infantry division to which it is attached, and to guard its front when halted and its flanks when fighting. In battles they will use every opportunity of taking the enemy in flank or rear or of getting at his artillery; will stave off flank attacks; will complete to the full the effects of a victory; or, in the case of a reverse, will protect the retirement by flank blows, etc. It is in these, its legitimate duties, that divisional cavalry finds frequent opportunities for distinguishing itself on service. But there are other minor and non-legitimate duties which it is too often called upon to perform, such as escorts to generals, guards to baggage and prisoners, post-riders, transport

conductors, and orderlies. Experience shows that these minor duties are very apt to be considered as the more important ones on service, and the result is that the force of divisional cavalry becomes frittered away by dribblets to these various minor uses until there is little or nothing left of any combatant force. Nor do the 'dribblets' effect their work in a manner altogether satisfactory, since their previous training has done little to prepare them for this particular rôle, a consideration which in the case of orderlies is a very important one. Moreover, the best men and the best horses are, of course, taken for the duties, which leave the inferior ones for the important work of reconnaissance and outposts. In the Franco-German War it was found that many squadrons, even after receiving their drafts of remounts, etc., were reduced to about half their proper strength — not by losses in action, but by the demands made upon them for mounted orderlies, etc. In many cases their total fighting strength amounted only to thirty files, and these consisting for the most part of inferior men and horses. Their efficiency was further injured by the withdrawal from them of numbers of officers required to act as gallopers owing to the inability of the untrained orderlies to convey verbal messages correctly.

"The system, while producing such dangerous disruptions, shows no corresponding advantages to balance them. It gives satisfaction to nobody. The staff find the untrained orderlies very unreliable for their purpose, the squadrons are denuded of their best men and horses and of their all too few officers, and the duty is most unpopular with all ranks. There are many ways of courting disaster, and the maintenance of this system appears to be one of them. The Germans have been the first to recognize the fact and to take practical steps to remedy it. Doubtless other armies will follow in their wake. In our own army we are luckily one step in advance of most others in this direction, having at our disposal a certain force of mounted infantry. This branch will on service take many of the duties that should not legitimately fall upon the divisional cavalry, such as escorts, convoys, and mounted orderlies. And it must be remembered that were it not so our squadrons, being on a very much lower establishment than those of foreign armies, would be unable to find any combatant force at all of divisional cavalry to oppose to that of the enemy; consequently it is the more incumbent upon us to develop our mounted infantry power. To effect this it would be necessary in the first place to increase our establishment of mounted infantry in men and horses; also to give them a special individual training, somewhat on the lines laid down in the German general order above described, to fit them for the duties of orderlies; and finally to add to their establishment a detachment of cyclist orderlies. These latter would be of more use than horsemen in most any country, now that roads exist everywhere, and bicycles are perfected to stand all the exigencies of service; and not requiring such long and varied instruction as their mounted comrades, the cyclists might at once, after preliminary instruction in their duties, be attached to the various district headquarter staffs, and so obtain

regular practice in their work in peace, and at the same time relieve men who are at present taken away for the duty from their proper regimental work. The duties would thus be performed with greater efficiency and satisfaction to all concerned, and the cavalrymen and horses would come again under the hand of their officers to be properly trained in their legitimate work instead of—as a certain squadron commander was heard to describe it—‘being used up by an infantry general in giving a fictitious show of importance to himself and staff.’ ”—*Army and Navy Gazette*.

This recalls to mind the cavalry experience of the Civil War, when notwithstanding the recommendations, appeals and warnings of experienced cavalry officers the real object of cavalry was ignored or misunderstood, and this valuable arm was frittered away. Details for body guards, personal escorts, numerous orderlies, etc., finally had to be curtailed in order to obtain any service commensurate with the expense of the numerous cavalry organizations. Such lessons cannot be too deeply impressed upon the minds of all officers, in order that they may avoid similar faults upon arriving at high commands.

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#### THE CAVALRY MANEUVERS.

The annual training of selected cavalry regiments under the superintendence of the Inspector-General of Cavalry, Major-General G. Luck, C. B., is proceeding satisfactorily. The division consists of six regiments. The Inspector-General commenced his work of supervision by a close inspection of each regiment.

Many of the regiments that are now out for maneuvers were similarly employed last year, and it is only reasonable that points either of resemblance or difference from their appearance and steadiness in the field this year as compared with last should be looked for. “To be frank,” says the correspondent of the *Morning Post*, “it must be said that the work so far as it has gone indicates that the squadrons are neither better nor worse than they were a year ago. The same faults as were apparent in the early days of the Berkshire maneuvers are evident now.” General Luck resolved before assuming command to give the brigades a protracted period of steady drill before entering upon the execution of schemes or of actions of opposing forces. In the fourth week, however, it is intended that a reconnaissance shall be made which will extend from Aldershot to the south coast.

The Duke of Cambridge will attend the maneuvers of General Luck's force on Wednesday and Thursday next.

The cavalry division drilled for the first time with the Royal Horse Artillery on Thursday. They were out from 9 A. M. till nearly 1 P. M., the heat being very great and the dust blinding. Special attack movements were carried out with the machine-gun section of



the Fourth Hussars, and they proved to be no unworthy rivals of the Royal Horse Artillery, by the workmanlike and smart manner the guns were brought into action. The details of the Third Hussars left behind were formed into a skeleton or flag division, as it is termed at Aldershot, and drilled during the earlier hours of the morning. On the conclusion of the maneuvers, probably about September 9th, the Household Cavalry return to Windsor and London, the Seventh Dragoon Guards march for Norwich, the Fourth Hussars move to Hounslow, and the Eighth to Leeds (with a squadron at York).—*Army and Navy Gazette*.

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### THE SEQUEL OF WAR.

It has been frequently urged that where the bullet or the sword kills its thousands, disease and insanitary conditions will slay their ten thousands. At the present time the victorious Japs, who so easily defeated their pig-tail opponents, have now to contend with a far more formidable enemy—cholera—and they do not like it. The last number of the transactions of the Imperial German Board of Health states that “according to official intelligence, dated June 2d, cholera is spreading in a most alarming way among the Japanese troops stationed in China, 500 fatal cases being reported to have occurred in the guard regiments alone at Port Arthur. It is feared that the impending return of the troops will cause a further spread of the disease in Japan. A communication from Seoul, dated July 17th, states that the cholera has broken out in Corea.” This intelligence is of interest, as it tends to confirm the observation that the seat of war is a fruitful ground for the propagation of disease, and that cholera, in particular, develops in places where war is being, or has lately been carried on. The apprehensions that the disease may spread in Japan by the return of the troops are abundantly warranted by the history of cholera, as shown by the facts collected by Herr A. HIRSCH. When cholera made its first appearance in Europe, in 1830, it was at once perceptible how important a part was played by war in the spread of this disease. It became prevalent in Russia in 1830, where it had asserted itself in spite of the hard winter that preceded the outbreak. The Russo-Polish War took place in that year, and an outbreak of cholera was the sequel to the march of Russian troops into Poland. From there the disease passed, carried by the waters of the Warsaw and Kalisch, and in a very short time was raging in the Prussian provinces of Posen and Silesia; then, through the Oder, it penetrated into the provinces of Brandenburg and Pomerania. In the following year it was seen that this was not the only way in which war aids in disseminating cholera. In May of 1831 some Russian warships arrived in Dantzic Harbor with several cases of cholera on board, which caused the inhabitants of Dantzic to become infected, and the disease spread thence by way of Elbing to Königsberg, and to the district of Köslin and Gumbinnen. It has been clearly proved that cholera



was introduced in 1849 by Austrian troops into Vienna, and in 1866 by English troops from Malta into Gibraltar, and this in times of peace. The most instructive observations, however, are those made during the wars of the year 1866. A few cases of cholera had occurred in Austria in the summer of 1865 at Fiume and Trieste; but in 1866, starting from the Bukovina, it spread over the whole of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, those provinces suffering most in which the principal events of the war had been enacted. Thus, from the province of Moravia 50,000 cases were reported; from Bohemia, 30,000; and from Lower Austria, 10,000; and it is well established that the cholera was then introduced into Prussia and Saxony from there. The influence of war was clearly perceptible in Bavaria, and in this case from the fact that Bavaria suffered most of all the South German States, while, as the pestilence was especially virulent just in the districts of Middle Franconia, Aschaffenberg, Suabia and Neuenburg, it may be safely affirmed that war was responsible, most essentially, for the severe character of the plague. —*Admiralty and Horse Guards Gazette.*

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#### MILITARY REORGANIZATION IN SWITZERLAND.

The *Revue Militaire Suisse*, for August, contains an article from the pen of Colonel LECOMTE on the proposed changes in organization and administration of the Swiss army, to be presented for adoption or rejection on November 3d, the Federal authorities of Switzerland having called together the electors to vote upon this question on that date. As the relationship of the various Swiss cantons is somewhat like that of our own sovereign states to the Federal Government, and as the proposed changes tend to great centralization and towards an increase of the Federal authority, the results of the voting will be awaited with great interest.

The article does not present a very roseate view of the new plan, either from a military or political standpoint. It argues: "You will in vain overburden our citizen-soldiers with incessant changes of Constitution, of laws, of regulations, of organizations and reorganizations; you will never succeed in making them the rivals of the Prussian Guard, which, furthermore, is not necessary in order to successfully defend our country of mountains and valleys."

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#### THE CAVALRY SOCIETY OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES.

##### CONSTITUTION.

1. The name of this Association shall be "THE CAVALRY SOCIETY OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES."
2. Any honorably discharged officer or soldier, who at any time has served in the cavalry corps in the said armies, shall be entitled to membership in the Society.

3. The object of the Society shall be the promotion of kindly feeling, the revival of old associations, and the collection and preservation of records of the services rendered by this corps during the "War of the Rebellion."

4. The officers of the Society shall consist of a president, seven vice-presidents, secretary, treasurer and historian, who shall be, with the exception of the historian, elected at each meeting of the Society.

5. The duties of the president shall be to preside at the annual meetings, to call extraordinary meetings of the Society in case of necessity, and to issue such orders as may be necessary for the good government and control of the Society.

6. The vice-president shall exercise the powers of the president in case of the absence of that officer.

7. The secretary shall keep a record of the minutes of the Society, a roll of members, and perform all duties usually pertaining to an office of such character.

8. The treasurer shall have control of all funds, to be expended only on approval of the president, and shall render an account of all disbursements at the annual meeting of the Society.

9. The historian shall prepare for the use of the secretary a history of the cavalry corps, and of all matters connected therewith of interest to the Society.

10. There shall be a standard bearer, who shall be an officer of the Society, and who shall be appointed at each annual meeting by the president. The duties of the standard bearer shall be to have charge and custody of the flag of the Society, and carry it on all occasions of ceremony when the Society shall be present.

11. There shall be elected annually an assistant secretary, who shall perform the duties of the secretary at the annual meetings of the Society in case of the absence of that officer, and who shall perform such other services as pertain to the office of secretary as may be required of him by that officer.

12. There shall be elected annually an adjutant-general, whose duty shall be to assist the president in all cases where the Society is formed for parade, and to act as an aide to the president, and perform such services as that officer may direct.

#### BY-LAWS.

1. The entrance fee of the Society shall be one dollar.

2. The annual dues shall be one dollar.

3. The president shall determine the time and place of each annual meeting, being governed in his selection thereof, as far as practicable, by the time and place of the meeting of the Society of the Army of the Potomac.

#### NEXT MEETING.

Place of meeting next year, as fixed by Society of the Army of the Potomac, is Burlington, Vt.; date not named.

## BADGE OF THE SOCIETY.

The badge of the Society is a pair of crossed sabers, accurately copied from the regulation cavalry saber, and finely finished in gold, upon a boldly worked "sunburst" of silver. It is attached to the coat or the ribbon of the Society by means of a brooch-pin at the back. Price, \$5.00. Send money with order to Major G. IRVINE WHITEHEAD, treasurer, 206 Broadway, New York.

## RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS.

The Cavalry Society met in the headquarters rooms of the Third Regiment of the Connecticut National Guards, and was called to order by the president, General JONATHAN P. CILLEY.

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## NOTES ON THE REUNION.

While the number of cavalymen in attendance at the reunion was larger than usual, and filled the commodious headquarters rooms of the Third Connecticut Regiment of National Guards, the absence of BARTLETT and his bugle was much lamented. The bugle calls during our service waked us in the morning, directed and timed each duty of the day, and in melodious tones as clearly enunciated as spoken words, "put out the lights" in our shelter tents at night as we pulled off our boots as the only unrobing act for the night. In field, in battle, and in camp, the bugle inspired and controlled us.

However, our flag was still there, and Captain BOEHM, our standard bearer. It is not generally known by the Cavalry Society what rich associations cluster round our beautiful silk banner, as the special gift of the great cavalry general, SHERIDAN, and that the name of our Society, which has the appearance of a misnomer, was fixed in its present form because SHERIDAN's large heart wanted to encircle every cavalryman in the United States, especially desiring that when the Society of the Army of the Potomac met in the western part of our country the cavalry boys in that section should come in as members and participants in our reunion.

The resolutions of the Cavalry Society, presented by General SAWTELLE at the meeting of the Army of the Potomac, in regard to a monument to the soldiers from the regiments of the regular army participating in the battle of Gettysburg, received a unanimous vote at such meeting, and Senator HAWLEY, who sat near General SAWTELLE, stated that he would give his personal efforts to secure the passage of an act for the purpose desired.

The cavalry reunion lacked some of the minor incidents which added much to the enjoyment had at Boston in 1893, but the impress New London left on our memory was most happy, and the pictures of the place where ARNOLD stood, appropriate in its sepulchral relations, and the remains of the old fort on Groton Heights will enable each visitor to remember the historical war flavor of the city, while its memorial library, and the most interesting of any relic of the past, "the old town mill," with its rocky stream and trees as they existed in their primitive form of 1650, will recall its literary and artistic aroma.—*Maine Bugle*.

## DIARY OF LIEUTENANT W. SWABEY.

The diary of Lieutenant W. SWABEY, R. H. A., in the Peninsula, edited by Colonel F. A. WHINYATES, has been appearing for some time in the *Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution*, Woolwich. It furnishes plain reading of every-day soldier life, and impresses one strangely in comparison with the grandiloquent and egotistical language of most French writings of that period, and of which there has been a goodly surfeit during the Napoleonic revival. There is but little attempt at explanation or discussion of campaigns or theories as to the conduct of the war, although an occasional outburst shows that all parts of the machine do some serious thinking once in awhile about their superiors.

A few scattered quotations will suffice to show some of the difficulties attending service at that time in the Spanish and Portuguese Peninsula:

*12th December.* We are now put to our wits' end about forage, and the villages being all exhausted, we have to look for it in the mountains, where it is so well concealed that it requires much labor to find it, and is a very precarious supply.

*25th February.* Marched to Capinha, part of the road being very hilly; we got in, however, by four o'clock. Green forage was all we could procure.

*26th February.* Marched by a good route to Atalaye. Still green forage. We halted on the road for about ten minutes by a rye field; the men were ordered to cut forage, and in that time filled sacks enough for 160 horses.

*29th February.* \* \* Our route was to Samadas, but there not being room for the cavalry and ourselves there, we proceeded to Villa Velha, which I may call the most miserable place in Portugal; no doors to our stables, and our billets hardly to be called covering, the night rainy, and no forage, green or dry, for the horses. There is a hospital for Portuguese troops in a church here, which, when I was at this place before, was ruined and empty. I was anxious to get the horses in, and opened the door, when all the cowardly rascals lying sick in their beds, cried out to the sentinel to bayonet me. I had not time to draw my sword and did not like to run, so I caught hold of his musket and grappled with him till I had explained that I did not want to put in the horses; he then let me go with his bayonet close to my breast. I left him next morning, after threatening to cane him, in custody of the militia captain who had charge, who promised he should be punished. No doubt if I could have drawn my sword the rascal would have made off, but being alone and having so many about me, I did not dare to try the experiment.

*7th March.* Spent my day at the troop stables endeavoring to cure the sore backs, of which, in this march, we have more than our share.

*8th March.* Went in the morning to see Sir STAPLETON COTTON inspect the Fifth Dragoon Guards. The condition of their horses far exceeds anything I have seen. It must be observed, however, without wishing to detract from their merits, that they have been lying in idleness at Thornar all the winter, whilst we and others have been on short forage and taking fatiguing marches. Their appointments and discipline, however, sufficiently prove that this good fortune is not the only cause of their present effective state.

*18th March.* Marched at 5 o'clock, in a most tremendous rain, and overtook the dragoons at Santa Martha, where only last night 300 French were turned out. The second day the horses have had no corn.

*20th March.* Rain all day. Our men having above a league to go for forage, wheat was cut, no other eatable for the horses being found. Occasional firing heard from Badajos, and various reports in circulation.

*21st March.* To my inexpressible joy there arrived for our use this day seventeen horses, most of which come to my division; the number of horses

that have died in it sufficiently proves that it is absolutely useless to send old horses on this or any other service. Rain all day. The service at Badajos must be exceedingly hard.

*4th April.* To-day I resolved to give up the idea of being settled even for a moment; for, whilst our horses were gone a league for forage, an order came to march to Torre de Almendral, two leagues. We arrived there in the evening without an atom of forage.

*26th July.* This evening at 8 o'clock we went out on picket, which I understand is to be the system pursued; as it is useless at a distance from the enemy I consider it a harassing order.

*15th October.* We lost this week one bombardier and three gunners, who died from a fever brought on by sheer weakness. I read the funeral service over some of them, and was surprised to see with what little reverence or awe the superstitious, ignorant Spaniards witnessed the ceremony, and with what little decency they behaved.

Campaigning under such circumstances was no doubt attended with a maximum of discomfort; the dangers from sickness, arising principally from improper food, and alternate billeting and exposure to the weather, were quite as great as those to be apprehended from the enemy. The constant change of masters caused the country people to fear both English and French. In one instance, while the British troops occupied a village, the French made requisition upon the alcalde for provisions, stating they would come for the supplies, and the demand was actually being complied with by the people when discovered by the troops occupying the place.

Altogether, the diary is most interesting reading, and is commended for its simple, manly record of a soldier's daily life.

#### RULES OF THE FORT LEAVENWORTH POLO CLUB.

1. The grounds to be about 750 feet long by 500 feet wide.
2. The goal posts to be twenty-four feet apart, and light enough to break if collided with.
3. For match games the height of the ponies must not exceed fourteen hands one inch. For practice games, at the discretion of the club, larger ponies may be used. No ponies showing vice to be allowed in the game.
4. In match games the regulation polo balls and mallets to be used.
5. Match games shall be for four periods of fifteen minutes each of actual play, with five minutes' rest between periods, and three minutes' rest after each goal is made.
6. Each team to choose an umpire, and if necessary, the two umpires to appoint a referee, whose decisions shall be final.
7. In all match games the number of players contending to be limited to four on a side.
8. In match games the game, in case of a tie, must be played on until one side obtains a goal.
9. The side that makes the most goals wins the game.
10. If the ball is hit above the top of the goal posts, but in the opinion of the umpire through, it shall be considered a goal.

11. Each team shall have a substitute in readiness to play when a match is on.

12. There shall be a captain for each team, who shall have the direction of positions and plays of his men.

13. No person, players, umpires and referee excepted, shall, under any circumstances, be allowed upon the ground during the progress of the game.

14. It is forbidden to touch an adversary, his pony or his mallet with the hand or mallet during play, or to strike the ball when dismounted.

15. A player shall not put his stick over his adversary's pony, either in front or behind. In riding off or hustling, a player shall not strike with his arm or elbow.

16. A player may hustle or ride out an antagonist, or interpose his pony before his antagonist, so as to prevent the latter reaching the ball; but he may not cross another player in possession of the ball, excepting at such a distance as to avoid all risk of a collision.

17. If two players are riding from different directions to hit the ball, and a collision appears probable, then the player in possession of the ball (*i. e.*, he who last hit the ball, or who is coming in the direction from which the ball was last hit) must be given way to.

18. Foul riding is careless and dangerous horsemanship, and lack of consideration for the safety of others.

19. In case of a foul (*viz*: infringement of Rules 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18), the umpire shall stop the game, and the side that has been fouled may claim either of the following penalties:

(a) That the umpire award the side fouled a half goal.

(b) A free hit for the side fouled, from where the ball was when the foul took place, none of the opposing side to be within ten yards of the ball.

(c) That the side which caused the foul take the ball back, and hit it off from behind their own goal line.

20. Whenever a player, either accidentally or intentionally, knocks the ball behind the line at the end at which the goal defended by his side is situated, it shall be deemed a safety knock-out, and shall score one-fourth of one goal against such player's side. When the ball is caromed out, or kicked out by a pony, it shall not score as above.

21. The game to begin when the ball is thrown between the contestants, who shall be in line facing each other in the middle of the field, unless it is agreed between the captains to charge; the charge is to be from a line thirty feet in front of the goal posts. When the signal to charge has been given by the referee, the first and second players must keep to the left of the ball until it has been hit.

22. In case of an accident to a player or a pony, or for any other reasonable cause, the referee may stop the game, and the time so lost shall not be counted. When the game is resumed, the ball shall

be thrown between the players, who shall be lined up at the point at which the ball stopped; but if the game is stopped on account of a foul, the ball is to be thrown in at the place at which the foul occurred.

23. When the limit of time has expired, the game must continue until the ball goes out of bounds, or a goal is made, and such over-time shall not be counted.

24. When the ball goes out of bounds at the sides, it must be thrown in from the place at which it went out by the referee, between the two sides, which shall be drawn up in line facing each other. When the ball goes out ends, the side defending that goal is entitled to a knock-out from the point at which it crossed the line. When the player having the knock-out causes unnecessary delay, the umpire may throw a ball on the field and call play. No opponent shall come within fifty feet of a player having the knock-out until the ball has been hit.

25. Ends shall be changed after every goal, or if no goal has attained, after half time. The ball must go over or clear of the line to be out, or to score a goal. If the ball is damaged, the umpire must stop the game, and throw in a new ball at the place where it was broken, and at right angles to the length of the ground.

26. Should a player's stick be broken, he must ride to the place where sticks are kept, and take one. On no account is a stick to be brought to him.

27. In the event of a stick being dropped, the player must pick it up himself.

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LIEUTENANT S. L. PATERSON, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, recently met with a fatal accident while playing polo at Quetta. His pony fell and rolled on him as the result of a collision with another pony, and the young officer received such serious injuries as to cause his death soon after being removed to the hospital.

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APROPOS of the intense love that cavalry horses have for music, a correspondent writes that when the Sixth Dragoons recently changed their quarters from Manchester to Edinburgh, a detachment was billeted for the night at Thirsk, where a mare belonging to one of the troopers was taken so ill as to be unable to proceed on the journey the following morning. Two days later, another detachment of the same regiment, accompanied by the band, arrived. The sick mare was in a loose box, but hearing the martial strains, kicked a hole through the side of her box, and making her way through the shop of a tradesman, took her place in the troop before she was secured and brought back to the stable. But the excitement had proved too great, and the subsequent exhaustion proved fatal.—*Admiralty and Horse Guards Gazette*.

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LIEUTENANT-GENERAL KEITH FRASER, C. M. G., Inspector-General of the British Cavalry, died July 31st.



## BOOK NOTICES AND EXCHANGES.

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RIDERS OF MANY LANDS. By Lieutenant Theodore Ayrault Dodge.  
New York. Harper & Bros.

Somewhere the author expresses a fear that his title has been given amiss,—that it should have been “Yarns of a Globe-Trotter, and Incidentally Horse Flesh.” Such a summing up helps us to get an idea of the plan of the book, although it is not entirely just. Colonel Dodge adopts the novel plan of visiting nearly every country in the world for facts, and whenever he sees the rider of anything, from a bike to a bullock, he gives his impressions in a very entertaining way. And then, for fear that you may tire, he adds many bright excursions into other fields,—from after-dinner speeches of Boucicault, to the dancing of Geisha girls and the virtues of old maids. In this way much space is taken up by matters somewhat foreign to the subject of the book, but the reader never regrets it, because it adds a good hearty seasoning to the whole.

This book will surprise a few of those who have a mania for foreign ideas. As an instance, it gives the judgment of a perfectly competent critic as to the relative value of our own and other types of cavalry. His conclusion is, that although we may not be so perfect in drill and in the maneuvering of masses as some others, we are away and ahead of them all in distance riding and in the ability to do heavy work without losing our horses. As this last element of education is the “daily bread” of cavalry, and as the cavalry battle is the most uncommon incident of modern war, we may conclude that the traditions of our short sixty years of American cavalry history are well worth preserving. Colonel Dodge has gathered a few, a very few of the performances of our troopers in border warfare. Such as they are, and they do not seem to be the most notable examples, they easily stand ahead of similar efforts in other services. Let us rake up more of the reports of scouts and raids in our own country, and we will find them full of the very best kind of work.

Upon an English style of riding the author has some wise reflections. It is true that John Bull has an easy eminence in polo playing, in tent-pegging, in fox hunting and in racing, and this probably explains the fact that he has fastened some of his cavalry

notions on most of the armies of the world. Many people lose sight of the fact that the riding of polo players, jockeys or fox hunters is not good form for cavalry, nor for any man who rides for pleasure, or with the purpose of covering a long distance on a single mount. Thus the cow-boy may be good at rough riding, but he is strictly a poor horseman, and consequently may not be a model for cavalry.

It will surprise some people to be told that an Englishman does not know a saddle horse. This animal is an American production. He is the most perfect creature born without a soul, and thrives where men are brave and women are divine. This animal is the product of the bad roads, the fine stock, and the sport-loving propensities of the land where he lives. The Southern gentleman rider, on an easy-gaited horse, with a rather long stirrup, is the best picture of man and horse combined that can be found in any land. As a model for cavalry, or for those who ride for pleasure, his style is best suited and more easily adopted than any other.

The English standard, which excludes the rack from the saddle gaits, and calls it "artificial," is shown to be wrong. The rack, amble and running walk are natural to three-fourths of all animals used for saddle purposes in the world, but only in our Southern States are these gaits studied, improved and bred from. Furthermore, no race of natural riders on earth rides at the trot, but wherever ease, handiness and ability are asked, these so-called artificial gaits are used. Not that we would exclude the trot—but read the book.

Further notice would perhaps trespass too much on ground which the author should reserve to himself. The whole book is bright and instructive.

E. S.

#### PROCEEDINGS OF THE BUFORD MEMORIAL ASSOCIATION.

This pamphlet contains the oration and several brief sketches in the shape of personal recollections of that most distinguished soldier, Major-General John Buford. Through the kindness of General Wilson, the Cavalry Association was furnished with a copy of the oration, and it appears in this issue of the JOURNAL. A portrait of General Buford appeared in the first volume of the CAVALRY JOURNAL, with an article from the pen of the distinguished President of the Association, Major-General Wesley Merritt.

The pamphlet is very handsomely printed and contains four excellent illustrations. It reflects great credit upon the taste of General Rodenbough, the Secretary, upon whom the preparation of the pamphlet devolved.

No young officer can read this little book without a feeling of patriotic pride. The history of Buford's cavalry at Gettysburg furnishes one of the most thorough proofs that it is to the Civil War young cavalymen must look for models, and not to the grand maneuvers of Europe, where the shock of charging divisions will ever be of the first consideration in cavalry training.

W. H. C.

"THE LOVE-LETTERS OF A PORTUGUESE NUN." Cassell Publishing Company. New York.

This little book contains five letters written by a young Portuguese nun to a French officer belonging to the troops which had been sent by Louis XIV to aid in the war against Spain in 1668, after his return to Paris. This seems a long time ago, but the letters have been preserved and have appeared in many editions in France, where they have been regarded as almost unrivaled. An incident related in the Swabey diary, relating to an occurrence over a hundred years later in the Peninsula War, of somewhat similar character, shows to what extremes the warm-hearted maidens of the Peninsula went in welcoming their foreign allies. It is a tale of dispelled illusions, broken enchantment, and bitter reality.

#### HORSES, SADDLES AND BRIDLES.

The following notice of Captain Carter's "Horses, Saddles and Bridles" appeared recently in the *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution* (British):

This work, though primarily adapted to the needs of the American service, contains much which will be welcomed by British cavalry officers, for within a comparatively small number of pages the author has brought together all the essential facts connected with saddlery and biting throughout the world—facts which otherwise are only to be obtained by prolonged research and comparison in many different languages and works.

The cavalry of the United States may be numerically weak, but there can be no question as to the very high degree of excellence they have attained, having due regard to the special conditions of their employment; and since our own cavalry are frequently at work under very similar ones, a careful study of the means by which their efficiency is obtained cannot be too strongly recommended. At the same time the book requires to be read with caution, for as the Americans are essentially a practical race, less attention is paid by them to the breaking and schooling of young horses than is advisable in cavalries where absolute precision in maneuver and cohesion in the charge form the chief reason for their existence.

In the chapter on the selection of remounts, the following excellent common-sense remark should be noticed: "Some horses apparently sound and without vice or fault, will still be far from desirable cavalry horses; a rough animal passed into the ranks will cause more discontent than he is worth."

Under the heading, "Age of Horses," some interesting facts are recorded. The oldest horse of which the author had personal knowledge is "Belle Mosby," who went through the whole Civil War, and is still living at the age of thirty-five. A Mexican army mule, which died in 1866, could be traced back over forty years.

The chapter on the "Endurance of Horses" is of exceptional interest, giving many details of the waste of horses during the Civil War, and the steps taken to remount the army during its continuance; the organization of the "Cavalry Bureau," on which this duty fell, should be carefully studied. The daily waste of horses throughout the year 1863-4 was 500, i.e., the rate was approximately .5 per cent.; this is heavy, but compares very favorably with many European experiences, notably with the French Grand Army in the march to Moscow.

Seats, saddles and bits are all treated with clearness and practical knowledge. Though the author's remarks contain nothing which in principle, at least, is not embodied in our own regulations, his views are stated in such a manner that the reason "why" is in all cases made sufficiently clear. This

is a point in which "regulations" necessarily fail, and hence in the absence of properly qualified teachers, bad habits are apt to arise, which appear to be in accordance with the letter of the regulation, but are in reality entirely opposed to its spirit. To detect these mistakes and correct a long-established practice is often the most difficult task for a young officer thrown on his own resources; and a more valuable guide to enable him to train his judgment to act on his own responsibility in these circumstances, it would be very difficult to discover.

#### THE UNITED SERVICE.

July, 1895: 1. A Plea for Bimetallism, by Lieutenant McBlain. 2. A Sicilian Brigand, by T. H. Farnham. 3. Commodore Conner, by B. S. P. Conner. 4. Chronicles of Carter Barracks, by Colonel H. W. Closson. 5. Another Forgotten General, by Edward Shippen, U. S. N. August, 1895: 1. A Reminiscence, by Captain H. R. Brinkerhoff. 2. International Law in the War Between Japan and China, by T. E. Holland. 3. Colonel Graham's Reconnaissance, by D. G. Adeë. 4. Recollections of Reconstruction, by Captain Chester. 5. The Boson's Song, by Casper Schenck, U. S. N. 6. Public Schools and Army Competitive Examinations, by Henry Knollys. September, 1895: 1. The Army of the Khedive and the Present Military Situation in Egypt, by O. G. Villard. 2. Moral Tactics, by W. E. Montague. 3. The Napoleonic Revival, by Wilder Graham. 4. A Literary Venture, by T. H. Farnham. 5. The Demonetization of Silver, by Lieutenant Campbell. 6. In the United States Navy Fifty Years Ago, by D. G. Adeë.

#### JOURNAL OF THE UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA. June, 1895.

1. A Military Museum for Simla, by Captain A. Wallace, Twenty-seventh Punjab Infantry. 2. Malaya as a Possible Recruiting Ground for the Indian Army, by Colonel M. J. King-Harmon. 3. Visual Signaling, by Lieutenant F. H. Pigon, First Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent. 4. Notes on Tactics and Organization of Artillery Masses, by Major E. N. Henriquez, Royal Artillery. 5. Rajputs—A Brief Account of their Origin, Religious Customs and History, with Notes Regarding their Fitness for Modern Military Service, by Lieutenant A. H. Bingley, Adjutant VII B. I. 6. Swordsmanship, by Lieutenants E. Stenson-Cooke and F. H. Whitton, London Rifle Brigade. 6. Sword and Pistol, by Colonel M. J. King-Harmon. 7. A Brief Description of Madagascar, by Captain F. C. Colomb, Forty-second Gurkha Rifles. 8. An Attack Scheme, by Major A. W. T. Radcliffe, Fourteenth Sikhs. 9. The Peace Establishment of the German Army, by Lieutenant R. G. Burton, First Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent.

#### JOURNAL OF THE MILITARY SERVICE INSTITUTION.

July, 1895: 1. Discipline (first honorable mention), by Lieutenant Steele. 2. An Antiquated Artillery Organization, by Captain Wagner. 3. Martial Law and Social Order, by Captain Chester. 4. Recruiting and Training of the Company, by Lieutenant Miller.

5. Our Artillery in the Mexican War, by Lieutenant Van Deusen.
6. A Technical Criticism, by Lieutenant Brooks. September, 1895:
1. The Army and the Civil Power, by Lieutenant Wallace. 2. The Story of a Rescue, by Colonel Carpenter. 3. Sea Coast Artillery, by Captain Reilly. 4. Fortifications and Field Operations, by Colonel Egbert. 5. Our Present Artillery Armament, by Lieutenant Berk-himer. 6. The Man Behind the Gun, by Captain Walker. 7. The Bicycle as a Military Machine, by Lieutenant Hill. 8. Martial Law in Ceylon, by Lieutenant Carbaugh. 9. Recruiting and Training of the Company, by Lieutenant Miller.

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JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.

- July, 1895: 1. Abstract of the Proceedings of the Fifty-eighth Annual General Meeting of the Royal Artillery Institution. 2. The Training Together in Peace Time the Garrison Artillery Forces, etc., by Captain E. G. Incalls, R. A. (commended essay, 1895). 3. Same by Lieutenant-Colonel O. W. White, R. A. (commended essay, 1895). August, 1895: 1. Instruments for Looking Through Thick Walls With Small Apertures, by Captain A. H. Russell, Ordnance Department U. S. Army. 2. An Account of the Relief of Chitral Fort from Gilgit and the Siege of Chitral, by Lieutenant C. G. Stewart, R. A. 3. Diary of Lieutenant W. Swabey, R. H. A., in the Peninsula, (continued).

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THE PENNSYLVANIA MAGAZINE OF HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY.

1. John Betchtel: His Contributions to Literature, etc., by John W. Jordan. 2. Journal Kept On Board the United States Frigate "Constitution," 1812, by Amos A. Evans, Surgeon U. S. Navy, by A. W. Evans. 3. Washington After the Revolution, 1784-1799, by William S. Boker. 4. Extracts From the Journal of Lieutenant John Bell Tilden, Second Pennsylvania Line, 1781-1782, by John Bell Tilden Phelps. 5. Defenses of Philadelphia in 1777, by Worthington Chauncey Ford. 6. A Register of Baptisms, Marriages and Deaths, 1772-1822, by Rev. William Rogers, D. D. 7. John Roberts, of Menon. 8. Recollections of Philadelphia Near Seventy Years Ago, by Benjamin Kite.

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JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES ARTILLERY. July, 1895.

1. Experiments with a New Polarizing Photo-Chronograph, by A. C. Chrehore and George O. Squire, First Lieutenant Third Artillery. 2. The Development of a Naval Militia, by Commander Jacob W. Miller. 3. Extracts from the Journal of Second Lieutenant John Wilkinson, Sixth Artillery. 4. A Proposed Modification of the Field Gun Sight, by Lieutenant Elwood E. Gayle, Second Artillery. 5. Coast Artillery Fire Instruction, by Lieutenant John A. Lundeen, Fourth Artillery. 6. Light Artillery Target Practice, by Lieutenant Ernest Hinds, Fourth Artillery. 7. German Foot Artillery with Horsed Guns (translation), by Lieutenant T. Bentley Mott.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE. Whole No. 74.

1. Prize Essay, 1895: Tactical Problems in Naval Warfare, by Lieutenant-Commander Richard Wainwright, U. S. A. 2. Water Motors as Marine Dynamo Drivers, by Lieutenant F. J. Hoesler, U. S. A. 3. The Growth of U. S. Naval Cadets, by Henry G. Beyer, M. D., Surgeon U. S. A. 4. The Training Service, by Lieutenant George R. Clark, U. S. A. 5. The Problem of Torpedo Discharge, by Lieutenant Albert Gleaves, U. S. A. 6. Honorable Mention, 1895: A Summary of the Situation and Outlook in Europe, by Richmond Pearson Hobson, Assistant Naval Constructor, U. S. A.

THE MAINE BUGLE. July, 1895.

1. An Episode of the Wilson Raid, by Lieutenant Coburn, First Maine Cavalry. 2. A Terrible Night on the Picket Line, by Sergeant Ellis, Second U. S. Cavalry. 3. A Sailor's Service, by F. E. Aylward. 4. An Incident of Confederate Service in Front of Petersburg, by G. S. Bernard. 5. Fifth New York Cavalry at Fairfax, by Captain F. S. Dickinson. 6. A Maine Poet, by W. H. Jones. 7. With Sheridan in Lee's Last Campaign, by Colonel F. C. Newhall. 8. The Cavalry Society of the Armies of the United States.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY RELATING TO THE HISTORY OF IOWA. Nos. 1 and 2. 1895.

Acquisition of Louisiana by the United States. The President Authorized to Take Possession of Louisiana. Proclamation and Address of Governor Claiborne. Louisiana Divided Into Two Territories. The Territory of Louisiana. The Territory of Missouri. The Common Law Adopted as a Rule of Decision. The Missouri Compromise.

THE AUTUMN MANEUVERS OF 1894, AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, FRANCE AND GERMANY. No. 6. Publications of Military Information Division, War Department.

THE IOWA HISTORICAL RECORD. July, 1895.

The Sioux Indian War. National Songs. The Indians of Tama County.


STANDING ORDERS FIRST CORPS OF CADETS, MASSACHUSETTS VOLUNTEER MILITIA. 1895.

REVUE DU CERCLE MILITAIRE.


REVUE MILITAIRE SUISSE.


THE RIDER AND DRIVER.

MILITAER WOCHENBLATT.









GENERAL HENRY LEAVENWORTH.

